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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

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DENNIS HOLLINGSWORTH, ET AL., :

Petitioners : No. 12-144

v. :

KRISTIN M. PERRY, ET AL. :

- - - - - x

Washington, D.C.

Tuesday, March 26, 2013

The above-entitled matter came on for oral argument before the Supreme Court of the United States at 10:07 a.m.

APPEARANCES:

CHARLES J. COOPER, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Petitioners.

THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ., Washington, D.C.; on behalf of Respondents.

DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., ESQ., Solicitor General, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for United States, as amicus curiae, supporting Respondents.

	C O N T E N T S	
1		
2	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	PAGE
3	CHARLES J. COOPER, ESQ.	
4	On behalf of the Petitioners	3
5	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
6	THEODORE B. OLSON, ESQ.	
7	On behalf of the Respondents	28
8	ORAL ARGUMENT OF	
9	DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR., ESQ.	
10	For United States, as amicus curiae,	
11	supporting Respondents	50
12	REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF	
13	CHARLES J. COOPER, ESQ.	
14	On behalf of the Petitioners	64
15		
16		
17		
18		
19		
20		
21		
22		
23		
24		
25		

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
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P R O C E E D I N G S

(10:07 a.m.)

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: We'll hear argument this morning in Case 12-144, Hollingsworth v. Perry.

Mr. Cooper?

ORAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES J. COOPER

ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

MR. COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court:

New York's highest court, in a case similar to this one, remarked that until quite recently, it was an accepted truth for almost everyone who ever lived in any society in which marriage existed. Marriage --

CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Cooper, we have jurisdictional and merits issues here. Maybe it'd be best if you could begin with the standing issue.

MR. COOPER: I'd be happy to, Mr. Chief Justice.

Your Honor, the official proponents of Proposition 8, the initiative, have standing to defend that measure before this Court as representatives of the people and the State of California to defend the validity of a measure that they brought forward.

JUSTICE GINSBURG: Have we ever granted standing to proponents of ballot initiatives?

1 MR. COOPER: No, Your Honor, the Court has
2 not done that, but the Court has never had before it a
3 clear expression from a unanimous State's high court
4 that --

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Well, this is -- this
6 is -- the concern is certainly, the proponents are
7 interested in getting it on the ballot and seeing that
8 all of the proper procedures are followed, but once it's
9 passed, they have no proprietary interest in it. It's
10 law for them just as it is for everyone else. So how
11 are they distinguishable from the California citizenry
12 in general?

13 MR. COOPER: They're distinguishable, Your
14 Honor, because the Constitution of the State of
15 California and its election code provide, according to
16 the unanimous interpretation of the California Supreme
17 Court, that the official proponents, in addition to the
18 other official responsibilities and authorities that
19 they have in the initiative process, that those official
20 proponents also have the authority and the
21 responsibility to defend the validity of that
22 initiative --

23 JUSTICE SCALIA: I guess the attorney
24 general of this State doesn't have any proprietary
25 interest either, does he?

1 MR. COOPER: No, Your Honor, nor did --

2 JUSTICE SCALIA: But -- but he can defend
3 it, can't he --

4 MR. COOPER: -- nor did --

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- because the law says he
6 can defend it.

7 MR. COOPER: That's right, Your Honor. Nor
8 did the legislative leaders in the Karcher case have --

9 JUSTICE KAGAN: Could the State --

10 MR. COOPER: -- any particular enforcement --

11 JUSTICE KAGAN: -- could -- could the State
12 assign to any citizen the rights to defend a judgment of
13 this kind?

14 MR. COOPER: Justice Kagan, that would be
15 a -- a very tough question. It's -- it's by no means
16 the question before the Court because -- because it
17 isn't any citizen. It's -- it is the -- it is the
18 official proponents that have a specific and -- and
19 carefully detailed --

20 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I just -- if you would
21 on the hypothetical: Could a State just assign to
22 anybody the ability to do this?

23 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I think it very
24 well might. It very well might be able to decide that
25 any citizen could step forward and represent the

1 interests of the State and the people in that State --

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, that would
3 be -- I'm sorry, are you finished?

4 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor.

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Okay. That -- that
6 may be true in terms of who they want to represent,
7 but -- but a State can't authorize anyone to proceed in
8 Federal court because that would leave the definition
9 under Article III of the Federal Constitution as to who
10 can bring -- who has standing to bring claims up to each
11 State. And I don't think we've ever allowed anything
12 like that.

13 MR. COOPER: But -- but, Your Honor, I guess
14 the point I want to make is that there is no question
15 the State has standing. The State itself has standing
16 to represent its own interests in the validity of its
17 own enactments. And if the State's public officials
18 decline to do that, it is within the State's authority
19 surely, I would submit, to identify, if not all -- any
20 citizen or at least supporter of -- of the measure,
21 certainly those, that that very clear and identifiable
22 group of citizens --

23 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, the Chief -- the
24 Chief Justice and Justice Kagan have given a proper
25 hypothetical to test your theory. But in this case the

1 proponents, number one, must give their official
2 address, they must pay money, and they must all act in
3 unison under California law. So these five proponents
4 were required at all times to act in unison, so that
5 distinguishes -- and to register and to pay money for
6 the -- so in that sense it's different from simply
7 saying any citizen.

8 MR. COOPER: But of course it is, and I
9 think the key --

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But can you tell me --
11 that's a factual background with respect to their right
12 to put the ballot initiative on the ballot, but how does
13 it create an injury to them separate from that of every
14 other taxpayer to have laws enforced?

15 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, the -- the question
16 before the Court, I would submit, is not the injury to
17 the individual proponents, it's the injury to the State.
18 The -- the legislators in the Karcher case had no
19 individual particularized injury, and yet this Court
20 recognized they were proper representatives of the
21 State's interests -- the State's injury --

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: At least one of the
23 amici have suggested that it seems counterintuitive to
24 think that the State is going to delegate to people who
25 don't have a fiduciary duty to them. That it's going to

1 delegate the responsibility of representing the State to
2 individuals who have their own views. They proposed the
3 ballot initiative because it was their individual views,
4 not necessarily that of the State. So --

5 MR. COOPER: Well --

6 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: -- Justice Scalia
7 proffered the question of the Attorney General. The
8 Attorney General has no personal interest.

9 MR. COOPER: True.

10 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: He has a fiduciary
11 obligation.

12 MR. COOPER: The Attorney General, whether
13 it's a fiduciary obligation or not, is in normal
14 circumstances the representative of the State to defend
15 the validity of the State's enactments when they are
16 challenged in Federal court. But when that officer
17 doesn't do so, the State surely has every authority and
18 I would submit the responsibility to identify
19 particularly in an initiative -- an initiative context.

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Why isn't the fiduciary
21 duty requirements before the State can designate a
22 representative important?

23 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I would submit to
24 you that I don't think there's anything in Article III
25 or in any of this Court's decisions that suggest that a

1 representative of a State must be -- have a fiduciary
2 duty, but I would also suggest --

3 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Well, generally you
4 don't need to specify it because generally the people
5 who get to enforce the legislation of the government are
6 people who are in government positions elected by the
7 people.

8 MR. COOPER: And Your Honor --

9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Here these individuals
10 are not elected by the people or appointed by the
11 people.

12 MR. COOPER: And the California Supreme
13 Court specifically addressed and rejected that specific
14 argument. They said it is in the context when the
15 public officials, the elected officials, the appointed
16 officials, have declined, have declined to defend a
17 statute. A statute that, by the way, excuse me, in this
18 case a constitutional amendment, was brought forward by
19 the initiative process.

20 The Court said it is essential to the
21 integrity, integrity of the initiative process in that
22 State, which is a precious right of every citizen. The
23 initiative process in that State, to ensure that when
24 public officials -- and after all, the initiative
25 process is designed to control those very public

1 officials, to take issues out of their hands.

2 And if public officials could effectively
3 veto an initiative by refusing to appeal it, then the
4 initiative process would be invalidated.

5 JUSTICE BREYER: That's -- historically, I
6 think, 40 States, many States have what was called a
7 public action. A public action is an action by any
8 citizen primarily to vindicate the interest in seeing
9 that the law is enforced.

10 MR. COOPER: In California --

11 JUSTICE BREYER: Now, that's the kind of
12 action I think that this Court has interpreted the
13 Constitution of the United States, case in controversy,
14 to say that it does not lie in the Federal system.

15 And of course, if that kind of action is the
16 very kind that does not lie, well, then to say, but they
17 really feel it's important that the law be enforced,
18 they really want to vindicate the process, and these are
19 people of special interests. They -- we found the five
20 citizens who most strongly want to vindicate the
21 interest in the law being enforced and the process for
22 making the law be enforced, well, that won't distinguish
23 it from a public action.

24 But then you say, but also they are
25 representing the State. At this point, the Dellinger

1 brief which takes the other side of it is making a
2 strong argument, well, they aren't the State. They are
3 really no more than a group of five people who feel
4 really strongly that we should vindicate this public
5 interest and have good reason for thinking it.

6 So you have read all these arguments that
7 it's not really the agent and so forth. What do you
8 want to say about it?

9 MR. COOPER: What I want to say, Your Honor,
10 is that according to the California Supreme Court, the
11 California Constitution says in terms that among the
12 responsibilities of official proponents, in addition to
13 the many other responsibilities that they step forward
14 and they assume in the initiative process, among those
15 responsibilities and authorities is to defend that
16 initiative if the public officials, which the initiative
17 process is designed to control, have refused to do it.
18 It might as well say it in those terms, Your Honor.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Counsel, if you want
20 to proceed to the merits, you should feel free to do so.

21 MR. COOPER: Thank you very much, Your
22 Honor.

23 My -- my -- excuse me. As I was saying, the
24 accepted truth -- excuse me. The accepted truth that --
25 that the New York high court observed is one that is

1 changing and changing rapidly in this country as people
2 throughout the country engage in an earnest debate over
3 whether the age-old definition of marriage should be
4 changed to include same-sex couples.

5 The question before this Court is whether
6 the Constitution puts a stop to that ongoing democratic
7 debate and answers this question for all 50 States. And
8 it does so only if the Respondents are correct that no
9 rational, thoughtful person of goodwill could possibly
10 disagree with them, in good faith, on this agonizingly
11 difficult issue.

12 The issues, the constitutional issues that
13 have been presented to the Court, are not of first
14 impression here. In *Baker v. Nelson*, this Court
15 unanimously dismissed for want of a substantial Federal
16 question.

17 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Cooper, *Baker v.*
18 *Nelson* was 1971. The Supreme Court hadn't even decided
19 that gender-based classifications get any kind of
20 heightened scrutiny.

21 MR. COOPER: That is --

22 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the same-sex intimate
23 conduct was considered criminal in many States in 1971,
24 so I don't think we can extract much in *Baker v. Nelson*.

25 MR. COOPER: Well, Your Honor, certainly I

1 acknowledge the precedential limitations of a summary
2 dismissal. But Baker v. Nelson also came fairly fast on
3 the heels of the Loving decision. And, Your Honor, I
4 simply make the observation that it seems implausible in
5 the extreme, frankly, for nine justices to have -- to
6 have seen no substantial Federal question if it is true,
7 as the Respondents maintain, that the traditional
8 definition of marriage, insofar as -- insofar as it does
9 not include same-sex couples, insofar as it is a gender
10 definition, is irrational and can only be explained --
11 can only be explained, as a result of anti-gay malice
12 and a bare desire to harm.

13 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Do you believe this can be
14 treated as a gender-based classification?

15 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I --

16 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It's a difficult question
17 that I've been trying to wrestle with it.

18 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. And we do
19 not. We do not think it is properly viewed as a
20 gender-based classification. Virtually every appellate
21 court, State and Federal, with one exception, Hawaii, in
22 a superseded the opinion, has agreed that it is not a
23 gender-based classification, but I guess it is gender
24 -based in the sense that marriage itself is a gendered
25 institution, a gendered term. And so in the same way

1 that fatherhood is gendered or motherhood is gendered,
2 it's gendered in that sense.

3 But we -- we agree that to the extent that
4 the classification impacts, as it clearly does, same-sex
5 couples, that -- that classification can be viewed as
6 being one of sexual orientation rather than --

7 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Outside of the --
8 outside of the marriage context, can you think of any
9 other rational basis, reason for a State using sexual
10 orientation as a factor in denying homosexuals benefits
11 or imposing burdens on them? Is there any other
12 rational decision-making that the government could make?
13 Denying them a job, not granting them benefits of some
14 sort, any other decision?

15 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I cannot. I do not
16 have any -- anything to offer you in that regard. I
17 think marriage is --

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: All right. If that --
19 if that is true, then why aren't they a class? If
20 they're a class that makes any other discrimination
21 improper, irrational, then why aren't we treating them
22 as a class for this one thing? Are you saying that the
23 interest of marriage is so much more compelling than any
24 other interest as they could have?

25 MR. COOPER: No, Your Honor, we certainly

1 are not. We -- we are saying the interest in marriage
2 and the -- and the State's interest and society's
3 interest in what we have framed as responsible pro --
4 procreation is -- is vital, but at bottom, with respect
5 to those interests, our submission is that same-sex
6 couples and opposite-sex couples are simply not
7 similarly situated.

8 But to come back to your precise question, I
9 think, Justice Sotomayor, you're -- you're probing into
10 whether or not sexual orientation ought to be viewed as
11 a quasi-suspect or suspect class, and our position is
12 that it does not qualify under this Court's standard
13 and -- and traditional tests for identifying
14 suspectedness. The -- the class itself is -- is quite
15 amorphous. It defies consistent definition as -- as the
16 Plaintiffs' own experts were -- were quite vivid on.
17 It -- it does not -- it -- it does not qualify as an
18 accident of birth, immutability in that -- in that
19 sense.

20 Again, the Plaintiffs --

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So you -- so what -- I
22 don't quite understand it. If you're not dealing with
23 this as a class question, then why would you say that
24 the government is not free to discriminate against them?

25 MR. COOPER: Well, Your Honor, I would think

1 that -- that -- I think it's a -- it's a very different
2 question whether or not the government can proceed
3 arbitrarily and irrationally with respect to any group
4 of people, regardless of whether or not they qualify
5 under this Court's traditional test for suspectedness.
6 And -- and the hypothetical I understood you to be
7 offering, I would submit would create -- it would --
8 unless there's something that -- that is not occurring
9 to me immediately, an arbitrary and capricious
10 distinction among similarly situated individuals,
11 that -- that is not what we think is at the -- at the
12 root of the traditional definition of marriage.

13 JUSTICE KAGAN: Mr. Cooper, could I just
14 understand your argument. As -- in reading the briefs,
15 it seems as though your principal argument is that
16 same-sex and opposite -- sex couples are not similarly
17 situated because opposite-sex couples can procreate,
18 same-sex couples cannot, and the State's principal
19 interest in marriage is in regulating procreation. Is
20 that basically correct?

21 MR. COOPER: I -- Your Honor, that's the
22 essential thrust of our -- our position, yes.

23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Is -- is there -- so you
24 have sort of a reason for not including same-sex
25 couples. Is there any reason that you have for

1 excluding them? In other words, you're saying, well, if
2 we allow same-sex couples to marry, it doesn't serve the
3 State's interest. But do you go further and say that it
4 harms any State interest?

5 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, we -- we go further
6 in -- in the sense that it is reasonable to be very
7 concerned that redefining marriage to -- as a genderless
8 institution could well lead over time to harms to that
9 institution and to the interests that society has
10 always -- has -- has always used that institution to
11 address. But, Your Honor, I --

12 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, could you explain that
13 a little bit to me, just because I did not pick this up
14 in your briefs.

15 What harm you see happening and when and how
16 and -- what -- what harm to the institution of marriage
17 or to opposite-sex couples, how does this cause and
18 effect work?

19 MR. COOPER: Once again, I -- I would
20 reiterate that we don't believe that's the correct legal
21 question before the Court, and that the correct question
22 is whether or not redefining marriage to include
23 same-sex couples would advance the interests of marriage
24 as a --

25 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, then are -- are you

1 conceding the point that there is no harm or denigration
2 to traditional opposite-sex marriage couples? So you're
3 conceding that.

4 MR. COOPER: No, Your Honor, no. I'm not
5 conceding that.

6 JUSTICE KENNEDY: Well, but, then it -- then
7 it seems to me that you should have to address Justice
8 Kagan's question.

9 MR. COOPER: Thank you, Justice Kennedy. I
10 have two points to make on them.

11 The first one is this, the Plaintiffs'
12 expert acknowledged that redefining marriage will have
13 real-world consequences, and that it is impossible for
14 anyone to foresee the future accurately enough to know
15 exactly what those real-world consequences would be.
16 And among those real-world consequences, Your Honor, we
17 would suggest are adverse consequences.

18 But consider the California voter, in 2008,
19 in the ballot booth, with the question before her
20 whether or not this age-old bedrock social institution
21 should be fundamentally redefined, and knowing that
22 there's no way that she or anyone else could possibly
23 know what the long-term implications of a profound
24 redefinition of a bedrock social institution would be.
25 That is reason enough, Your Honor, that would hardly be

1 irrational for that voter to say, I believe that this
2 experiment, which is now only fairly four years old,
3 even in Massachusetts, the oldest State that is
4 conducting it, to say, I think it better for California
5 to hit the pause button and await additional information
6 from the jurisdictions where this experiment is still
7 maturing.

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: Mr. Cooper, let me -- let
9 me give you one -- one concrete thing. I don't know why
10 you don't mention some concrete things. If you redefine
11 marriage to include same-sex couples, you must -- you
12 must permit adoption by same-sex couples, and there's --
13 there's considerable disagreement among -- among
14 sociologists as to what the consequences of raising a
15 child in a -- in a single-sex family, whether that is
16 harmful to the child or not. Some States do not -- do
17 not permit adoption by same-sex couples for that reason.

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: California -- no,
19 California does.

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: I don't think we know the
21 answer to that. Do you know the answer to that, whether
22 it -- whether it harms or helps the child?

23 MR. COOPER: No, Your Honor. And there's --
24 there's --

25 JUSTICE SCALIA: But that's a possible

1 deleterious effect, isn't it?

2 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, it -- it is
3 certainly among the --

4 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It wouldn't be in
5 California, Mr. Cooper, because that's not an issue, is
6 it? In California, you can have same-sex couples
7 adopting a child.

8 MR. COOPER: That's right, Your Honor. That
9 is true. And -- but -- but, Your Honor, here's --
10 here's the point --

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: I -- it's true, but
12 irrelevant. They're arguing for a nationwide rule which
13 applies to States other than California, that every
14 State must allow marriage by same-sex couples. And so
15 even though States that believe it is harmful -- and I
16 take no position on whether it's harmful or not, but it
17 is certainly true that -- that there's no scientific
18 answer to that question at this point in time.

19 MR. COOPER: And -- and that, Your Honor, is
20 the point I am trying to make, and it is the
21 Respondents' responsibility to prove, under rational
22 basis review, not only that -- that there clearly will
23 be no harm, but that it's beyond debate that there will
24 be no harm.

25 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Cooper, you are

1 defending -- you are opposing a judgment that applies to
2 California only, not to all of the States.

3 MR. COOPER: That's true, Your Honor. And
4 if there were a way to -- to cabin the arguments that
5 are being presented to you to California, then the
6 concerns about redefining marriage in -- in California
7 could be confined to California, but they cannot, Your
8 Honor.

9 JUSTICE KENNEDY: I -- I think there's --
10 there's substantial -- that there's substance to the
11 point that sociological information is new. We have
12 five years of information to weigh against 2,000 years
13 of history or more.

14 On the other hand, there is an immediate
15 legal injury or legal -- what could be a legal injury,
16 and that's the voice of these children. There are some
17 40,000 children in California, according to the Red
18 Brief, that live with same-sex parents, and they want
19 their parents to have full recognition and full status.
20 The voice of those children is important in this case,
21 don't you think?

22 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, I certainly would
23 not dispute the importance of that consideration. That
24 consideration especially in the political process where
25 this issue is being debated and will continue to be

1 debated, certainly, in California. It's being debated
2 elsewhere. But on that -- on that specific question,
3 Your Honor, there -- there simply is no data.

4 In fact, their expert agreed there is no
5 data, no study, even, that would examine whether or not
6 there is any incremental beneficial effect from marriage
7 over and above the domestic partnership laws that were
8 enacted by the State of California to recognize,
9 support, and honor same-sex relationships and their
10 families. There is simply no data at all that would --
11 that would permit one to draw -- draw that conclusion.

12 I would recall, Justice Kennedy, the point
13 made in Romer, that under a rational basis of review,
14 the provision will be sustained even if it operates to
15 the disadvantage of a group, if it is -- if it otherwise
16 advances rationally a legitimate State interest.

17 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Cooper, we will
18 afford you more time. You shouldn't worry about losing
19 your rebuttal time, but please continue on.

20 MR. COOPER: Oh --

21 JUSTICE BREYER: As long as you are on that,
22 then I would like to ask you this, assume you could
23 distinguish California, suppose we accept your argument
24 or accept Justice Scalia's version of your argument and
25 that distinguishes California. Now, let's look at

1 California. What precisely is the way in which allowing
2 gay couples to marry would interfere with the vision of
3 marriage, as procreation of children, that allowing
4 sterile companies -- couples of different sexes to marry
5 would not?

6 I mean, there are lots of people who get
7 married who can't have children. To take a State that
8 does allow adoption and say -- there, what is the
9 justification for saying no gay marriage? Certainly not
10 the one you said, is it?

11 MR. COOPER: You're --

12 JUSTICE BREYER: Am I not clear?

13 Look, you said that the problem is marriage
14 as an institution that furthers procreation.

15 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor.

16 JUSTICE BREYER: And the reason there was
17 adoption, but that doesn't apply to California. So
18 imagine I wall off California and I'm looking just
19 there, where you say that doesn't apply. Now, what
20 happens to your argument about the institution of
21 marriage as a tool towards procreation? Given the fact
22 that, in California, too, couples that aren't gay, but
23 can't have children get married all the time.

24 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor. The concern
25 is that redefining marriage as a genderless institution

1 will sever its abiding connection to its historic
2 traditional procreative purposes and it will refocus,
3 refocus the purpose of marriage and the definition of
4 marriage away from the raising of children and to the
5 emotional needs and desires of adults -- of adult
6 couples.

7 Suppose, in turn --

8 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, suppose a State
9 said -- Mr. Cooper, suppose a State said that because we
10 think that the focus of marriage really should be on
11 procreation, we are not going to give marriage licenses
12 anymore to any couple where both people are over the age
13 of 55. Would that be constitutional?

14 MR. COOPER: No, Your Honor, it would not be
15 constitutional.

16 JUSTICE KAGAN: Because that's the same
17 State interest, I would think, you know. If you are
18 over the age of 55, you don't help us serve the
19 government's interest in regulating procreation through
20 marriage. So why is that different?

21 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, even with respect
22 to couples over the age of 55, it is very rare that both
23 couples -- both parties to the couple are infertile, and
24 the traditional --

25 (Laughter.)

1 JUSTICE KAGAN: No, really, because if the
2 couple -- I can just assure you, if both the woman and
3 the man are over the age of 55, there are not a lot of
4 children coming out of that marriage.

5 (Laughter.)

6 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, society's --
7 society's interest in responsible procreation isn't just
8 with respect to the procreative capacities of the couple
9 itself. The marital norm, which imposes the -- the
10 obligations of fidelity and monogamy, Your Honor,
11 advances the interests in responsible procreation by
12 making it more likely that neither party, including the
13 fertile party to that --

14 JUSTICE KAGAN: Actually, I'm not even --

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I suppose we could have a
16 questionnaire at the marriage desk when people come in
17 to get the marriage -- you know, are you fertile or are
18 you not fertile?

19 (Laughter.)

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: I suspect this Court would
21 hold that to be an unconstitutional invasion of privacy,
22 don't you think?

23 JUSTICE KAGAN: Well, I just asked about
24 age. I didn't ask about anything else. That's not an
25 -- we ask about people's age all the time.

1 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, and even asking
2 about age, you would have to ask if both parties are
3 infertile. Again --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Strom Thurmond was -- was
5 not the chairman of the Senate committee when Justice
6 Kagan was confirmed.

7 (Laughter.)

8 MR. COOPER: Very few men -- very few men
9 outlive their own fertility. So I just --

10 JUSTICE KAGAN: A couple where both people
11 are over the age of 55 --

12 MR. COOPER: I --

13 JUSTICE KAGAN: A couple where both people
14 are over the age of 55.

15 MR. COOPER: And Your Honor, again, the
16 marital norm which imposes upon that couple the
17 obligation of fidelity --

18 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry, where is
19 that --

20 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm sorry, maybe you
21 can finish your answer to Justice Kagan.

22 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I'm sorry.

23 MR. COOPER: It's designed, Your Honor, to
24 make it less likely that either party to that -- to that
25 marriage will engage in irresponsible, procreative

1 conduct outside of that marriage. Outside of that
2 marriage. That's the marital -- that's the marital
3 norm. Society has an interest in seeing a 55-year-old
4 couple that is -- just as it has an interest of seeing
5 any heterosexual couple that intends to engage in a
6 prolonged period of cohabitation to reserve that until
7 they have made a marital commitment, a marital
8 commitment. So that, should that union produce any
9 offspring, it would be more likely that that child or
10 children will be raised by the mother and father who
11 brought them into the world.

12 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Mr. Cooper, we said that
13 somebody who is locked up in prison and who is not going
14 to get out has a right to marry -- has a fundamental
15 right to marry, no possibility of procreation.

16 MR. COOPER: Your Honor is referring, I'm
17 sure, to the Turner case, and --

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Yes.

19 MR. COOPER: -- I think that, with due
20 respect, Justice Ginsburg, way over-reads -- way
21 over-reads Turner against Safley. That was a case in
22 which the prison at issue -- and it was decided in the
23 specific context of a particular prison -- where there
24 were both female and male inmates, many of them minimum
25 security inmates. It was dealing with a regulation,

1 Your Honor, that had previously permitted marriage in
2 the case of pregnancy and childbirth.

3 The Court -- the Court here emphasized that,
4 among the incidents of marriage that are not destroyed
5 by that -- at least that prison context, was the
6 expectation of eventual consummation of the marriage and
7 legitimation of -- of the children. So that --

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you,
9 Mr. Cooper.

10 MR. COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

11 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Olson?

12 ORAL ARGUMENT OF THEODORE B. OLSON

13 ON BEHALF OF THE RESPONDENTS

14 MR. OLSON: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice,
15 and may it please the Court:

16 I know that you will want me to spend a
17 moment or two addressing the standing question, but
18 before I do that, I thought that it would be important
19 for this Court to have Proposition 8 put in context,
20 what it does.

21 It walls-off gays and lesbians from
22 marriage, the most important relation in life, according
23 to this Court, thus stigmatizing a class of Californians
24 based upon their status and labeling their most
25 cherished relationships as second-rate, different,

1 unequal, and not okay.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Mr. Olson, I cut off
3 your friend before he could get into the merits. So I
4 think it's only fair --

5 MR. OLSON: I was trying to avoid that, Your
6 Honor.

7 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I know --

8 (Laughter.)

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, I think it's
10 only fair to treat you the same. Perhaps you could
11 address your jurisdictional argument?

12 MR. OLSON: Yes. I think that our
13 jurisdictional argument is, as we set forth in the
14 brief, California cannot create Article III standing by
15 designating whoever it wants to defend the State of
16 California in connection with the ballot.

17 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But this is not whoever it
18 wants. These are five proponents of -- of the measure
19 and if we were to accept your argument, it would give
20 the State a one-way ratchet. The State could go in and
21 make a defense, maybe a half-hearted defense of the
22 statute, and -- and then when the statute is held
23 invalid, simply -- simply leave. On the other hand,
24 if -- if the State loses, the State can appeal.

25 So this is a one-way ratchet as it favors

1 the State and allows governors and other constitutional
2 officers in different States to thwart the initiative
3 process.

4 MR. OLSON: That's the -- that's the way the
5 California Supreme Court saw it with respect to
6 California law. The governor and the Attorney General
7 of California are elected to act in the best interests
8 of the State of California. They made a professional
9 judgment given their obligations as officers of the
10 State of California.

11 The California Supreme Court has said that
12 proponents -- and by the way, only four of the five are
13 here. Dr. Tam withdrew from the case because of some --
14 many things he said during the election -- campaign.

15 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, Mr. Olson, is it your
16 position that the only people who could defend a
17 ballot -- a law that's adopted in California through the
18 ballot initiative are the Attorney General and the
19 governor, so that if the Attorney General and the
20 governor don't like the ballot initiative, it will go
21 undefended? Is that your position?

22 MR. OLSON: I don't -- I don't think it's
23 quite that limited. I think one of your colleagues
24 suggested that there could be an officer appointed.
25 There could be an appointee of the State of California

1 who had responsibility, fiduciary responsibility to the
2 State of California and the citizens of California, to
3 represent the State of California along --

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Who -- who would appoint
5 him? The same governor that didn't want to defend the
6 plebiscite?

7 MR. OLSON: Well, that happens all the time.
8 As you recall in the case of -- well, let's not spend
9 too much time on independent counsel provisions, but --

10 (Laughter.)

11 MR. OLSON: The governor -- the government
12 of the State of California frequently appoints an
13 attorney where there's a perceived conflict of
14 interest --

15 JUSTICE SCALIA: I suppose --

16 MR. OLSON: -- and that person would have a
17 responsibility for the State and might have
18 responsibility for the attorneys' fees.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I suppose there
20 might be people out there with their own personal
21 standing, someone who performs marriages and would like
22 that to remain open to everyone but would prefer not to
23 perform same-sex marriages, or other people. We seem to
24 be addressing the case as if the only options are the
25 proponents here or the State. I'm not sure there aren't

1 other people out there with individual personalized
2 injury that would satisfy Article III.

3 MR. OLSON: There might well be in -- in a
4 different case. I don't know about this case. If there
5 was, for example, this was an initiative measure that
6 allocated certain resources of the State of California
7 and the people -- maybe it was a binary system of people
8 got resources and other people didn't get resources,
9 there could be standing. Someone would show actual
10 injury.

11 The point, I guess, at the bottom of this is
12 the Supreme Court -- this Court, decided in
13 *Raines v. Byrd* that Congress couldn't specify members of
14 Congress in that context even where the measure depleted
15 or diminished powers of Congress --

16 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Olson, I think the
17 bottom line --

18 JUSTICE ALITO: The States are not bound by
19 the same separation of powers doctrine that underlies
20 the Federal Constitution. You couldn't have a Federal
21 initiative, for example. They're free of all that.

22 So start from the proposition that a State
23 has standing to defend the constitutionality of a State
24 law -- beyond dispute. The question then is, who
25 represents the State?

1 Now, in a State that has initiative, the
2 whole process would be defeated if the only people who
3 could defend the statute are the elected public
4 officials. The whole point -- you know this better than
5 I do because you're from California -- the whole point
6 of the initiative process was to allow the people to
7 circumvent public officials about whom they were
8 suspicious.

9 So if you reject that proposition, what is
10 left is the proposition that the State -- State law can
11 choose some other person, some other group to defend the
12 constitutionality of a State law. And the California
13 Supreme Court has told us that the Plaintiffs in this
14 case are precisely those people.

15 So how do you get around that?

16 MR. OLSON: The only -- that's exactly what
17 the California Supreme Court thought. The California
18 Supreme Court thought that it could decide that the
19 proponents, whoever they were, and this could be
20 25 years after the election, it could be one of the
21 proponents, it could be four of the proponents. They
22 could have an interest other than the State because they
23 have no fiduciary responsibility to the State. They may
24 be incurring attorneys' fees on behalf of the State or
25 on behalf of themselves, but they haven't been

1 appointed. They have no official responsibility to the
2 State.

3 And my only argument, and I know it's a
4 close one because California thinks that this is the
5 system. The California Supreme Court thought that this
6 was a system that would be a default system. I'm
7 suggesting from your decisions with respect to Article
8 III that that takes more than that under --

9 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Olson, I think that
10 you're not answering the fundamental fear. And so --
11 and -- and the amici brief that sets forth this test of
12 fiduciary duty doesn't quite either.

13 The assumption is that there are not
14 executive officials who want to defend the law. They
15 don't like it. No one's going to do that. So how do
16 you get the law defended in that situation?

17 MR. OLSON: I don't have an answer to that
18 question unless there's an appointment process either
19 built into the system where it's an officer of
20 California or --

21 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: So why -- why isn't this
22 viewed as an appointment process that the in -- the
23 ballot initiators have now become that body?

24 MR. OLSON: And that's the argument --

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: That your argument --

1 MR. OLSON: That's our -- that's the
2 argument our opponents make. But it -- but it must be
3 said that it happens all of the time. That Federal
4 officials and State officials decide not to enforce a
5 statute, to enforce a statute in certain ways. We don't
6 then come in and decide that there's someone else ought
7 to be in court for every particular --

8 JUSTICE BREYER: What the brief says is, of
9 course, you can appoint people. It's not just that you
10 appoint them, it's that the State's interest when it
11 defends a law is the interest in executing the law of
12 the State. So all you have to do is give a person that
13 interest. But when a person has the interest of
14 defending this law, as opposed to defending the law of
15 the State of California, there can be all kinds of
16 conflicts, all kinds of situations.

17 That's what I got out of the brief. So give
18 the person that interest. And that, they say, is what's
19 missing here. And you'll say -- I mean, that's --
20 that's here, and you say it's missing here.

21 MR. OLSON: Yeah, I don't --

22 JUSTICE BREYER: Why is it missing here?

23 MR. OLSON: It is -- what is missing here
24 because you're not an officer of the State of
25 California. You don't have a fiduciary duty to the

1 State of California. You're not bound by the ethical
2 standards of an officer of the State of California to
3 represent the State of California. You could have
4 conflicts of interest. And as I said, you'd be -- could
5 be incurring enormous legal fees, on behalf of the
6 State, when the State hasn't decided to go that route.
7 I think --

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You should feel free
9 to move on to the merits.

10 MR. OLSON: Thank you, Your Honor. As I
11 pointed out at the -- at the outset, this is a measure
12 that walls off the institution of marriage, which is not
13 society's right. It's an individual right that this
14 Court again and again and again has said the right to
15 get married, the right to have the relationship of
16 marriage is a personal right. It's a part of the right
17 of privacy, association, liberty, and the pursuit of
18 happiness.

19 In the cases in which you've described the
20 right to get married under the Constitution, you've
21 described it as marriage, procreation, family, other
22 things like that. So the procreation aspect, the
23 responsibility or ability or interest in procreation is
24 not a part of the right to get married. Now, that --

25 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I'm not sure,

1 counsel, that it makes -- I'm not sure that it's right
2 to view this as excluding a particular group. When the
3 institution of marriage developed historically, people
4 didn't get around and say let's have this institution,
5 but let's keep out homosexuals. The institution
6 developed to serve purposes that, by their nature,
7 didn't include homosexual couples.

8 It is -- yes, you can say that it serves
9 some of the other interests where it makes sense to
10 include them, but not all the interests. And it seems
11 to me, your friend argues on the other side, if you have
12 an institution that pursues additional interests, you
13 don't have to include everybody just because some other
14 aspects of it can be applied to them.

15 MR. OLSON: Well, there's a couple of
16 answers to that, it seems to me, Mr. Chief Justice. In
17 this case, that decision to exclude gays and lesbians
18 was made by the State of California.

19 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Oh, that's only
20 because Proposition 8 came 140 days after the California
21 Supreme Court issued its decision.

22 MR. OLSON: That's right.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And don't you think
24 it's more reasonable to view it as a change by the
25 California Supreme Court of this institution that's been

1 around since time immemorial?

2 MR. OLSON: The California Supreme Court,
3 like this Supreme Court, decides what the law is. The
4 California Supreme Court decided that the Equal
5 Protection and Due Process Clauses of that California
6 Constitution did not permit excluding gays and lesbians
7 from the right to get married --

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: You -- you've led me right
9 into a question I was going to ask. The California
10 Supreme Court decides what the law is. That's what we
11 decide, right? We don't prescribe law for the future.
12 We -- we decide what the law is. I'm curious, when --
13 when did -- when did it become unconstitutional to
14 exclude homosexual couples from marriage? 1791? 1868,
15 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted?

16 Sometimes -- some time after Baker, where we
17 said it didn't even raise a substantial Federal
18 question? When -- when -- when did the law become this?

19 MR. OLSON: When -- may I answer this in the
20 form of a rhetorical question? When did it become
21 unconstitutional to prohibit interracial marriages?
22 When did it become unconstitutional to assign children
23 to separate schools.

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's an easy question, I
25 think, for that one. At -- at the time that the -- the

1 Equal Protection Clause was adopted. That's absolutely
2 true.

3 But don't give me a question to my question.

4 (Laughter.)

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: When do you think it became
6 unconstitutional? Has it always been unconstitutional?

7 MR. OLSON: When the -- when the California
8 Supreme Court faced the decision, which it had never
9 faced before, is -- does excluding gay and lesbian
10 citizens, who are a class based upon their status as
11 homosexuals -- is it -- is it constitutional --

12 JUSTICE SCALIA: That -- that's not when it
13 became unconstitutional. That's when they acted in an
14 unconstitutional matter -- in an unconstitutional
15 manner. When did it become unconstitutional to prohibit
16 gays from marrying?

17 MR. OLSON: That -- they did not assign a
18 date to it, Justice Scalia, as you know. What the court
19 decided was the case that came before it --

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: I'm not talking about the
21 California Supreme Court. I'm talking about your
22 argument. You say it is now unconstitutional.

23 MR. OLSON: Yes.

24 JUSTICE SCALIA: Was it always
25 unconstitutional?

1 MR. OLSON: It was constitutional when we --
2 as a culture determined that sexual orientation is a
3 characteristic of individuals that they cannot control,
4 and that that --

5 JUSTICE SCALIA: I see. When did that
6 happen? When did that happen?

7 MR. OLSON: There's no specific date in
8 time. This is an evolutionary cycle.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: Well, how am I supposed to
10 know how to decide a case, then --

11 MR. OLSON: Because the case that's before
12 you --

13 JUSTICE SCALIA: -- if you can't give me a
14 date when the Constitution changes?

15 MR. OLSON: -- in -- the case that's before
16 you today, California decided -- the citizens of
17 California decided, after the California Supreme Court
18 decided that individuals had a right to get married
19 irrespective of their sexual orientation in California
20 and then the Californians decided in Proposition 8, wait
21 a minute, we don't want those people to be able to get
22 married.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So -- so your
24 case -- your case would be different if Proposition 8
25 was enacted into law prior to the California Supreme

1 Court decision?

2 MR. OLSON: I would make -- I would make
3 the -- also would make the -- that distinguishes it in
4 one respect. But what also -- also -- I would also make
5 the argument, Mr. Chief Justice, that we are -- this --
6 marriage is a fundamental right and we are making a
7 classification based upon a status of individuals, which
8 this Court has repeatedly decided that gays and lesbians
9 are defined by their status. There is no question about
10 that.

11 JUSTICE SCALIA: So it would be
12 unconstitutional even in States that did not allow
13 civil unions?

14 MR. OLSON: We do, we submit that. You
15 could write a narrower decision.

16 JUSTICE SCALIA: Okay. So I want to know
17 how long it has been unconstitutional in those --

18 MR. OLSON: I don't -- when -- it seems to
19 me, Justice Scalia, that --

20 JUSTICE SCALIA: It seems to me you ought to
21 be able to tell me when. Otherwise, I don't know how to
22 decide the case.

23 MR. OLSON: I -- I submit you've never
24 required that before. When you decided that -- that
25 individuals -- after having decided that separate but

1 equal schools were permissible, a decision by this
2 Court, when you decided that that was unconstitutional,
3 when did that become unconstitutional?

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: 50 years ago, it was okay?

5 MR. OLSON: I -- I can't answer that
6 question and I don't think this Court has ever phrased
7 the question in that way.

8 JUSTICE SCALIA: I can't either. That's the
9 problem. That's exactly the problem.

10 MR. OLSON: But what I have before you now,
11 the case that's before you today is whether or not
12 California can take a class of individuals based upon
13 their characteristics, their distinguishing
14 characteristics, remove from them the right of privacy,
15 liberty, association, spirituality, and identity that --
16 that marriage gives them.

17 It -- it is -- it is not an answer to say
18 procreation or anything of that nature because
19 procreation is not a part of the right to get married.

20 JUSTICE KENNEDY: That's really -- that's a
21 broad argument that you -- that's in this case if the
22 Court wants to reach it. The rationale of the Ninth
23 Circuit was much more narrow. It basically said that
24 California, which has been more generous, more open to
25 protecting same-sex couples than almost any State in the

1 Union, just didn't go far enough and it's being
2 penalized for not going far enough.

3 That's a very odd rationale on which to
4 sustain this opinion.

5 MR. OLSON: This Court has always looked
6 into the context. In, for example, the New Orleans case
7 involving the gambling casinos and advertising, you look
8 at the context of what was permitted, what was not
9 permitted, and does that rationalization for prohibiting
10 in that case the advertising, in this case prohibiting
11 the relationship of marriage, does it make any sense in
12 the context of what exists?

13 JUSTICE ALITO: Oh seriously, Mr. Olson,
14 if California provides all the substantive benefits of
15 marriage to same-sex domestic partnerships, are you
16 seriously arguing that if California -- if the State --
17 if the case before us now were from a State that doesn't
18 provide any of those benefits to same-sex couples, this
19 case would come out differently?

20 MR. OLSON: No, I don't think it would come
21 out differently because of the fundamental arguments
22 we're making with respect to class-based distinctions
23 with respect to a fundamental right. However, to the
24 extent that my opponent in the context of California,
25 talks about child-rearing or adoptions or -- or of

1 rights of people to live together and that sort of
2 thing, those arguments can't be made on behalf of
3 California because California's already made a decision
4 that gay and lesbian individuals are perfectly suitable
5 as parents, they're perfectly suitable to adopt, they're
6 raising 37,000 children in California, and the expert on
7 the other side specifically said and testified that they
8 would be better off when their parents were allowed to
9 get married.

10 JUSTICE ALITO: I don't think you can have
11 it both ways. Either this case is the same, this would
12 be the same if this were Utah or Oklahoma or it's
13 different because it's California and California has
14 provided all these --

15 MR. OLSON: I -- I think that it's not that
16 we're arguing that those are inconsistent. If the -- if
17 the fundamental thing is that denying gays and lesbians
18 the right of marriage, which is fundamental under your
19 decisions, that is unconstitutional. If it is -- if the
20 State comes forth with certain arguments -- Utah might
21 come forth with certain justifications. California
22 might come forth with others. But the fact is that
23 California can't make the arguments about adoption or
24 child-rearing or people living together because they
25 have already made policy decisions. So that doesn't

1 make them inconsistent.

2 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So it's just
3 about -- it's just about the label in this case.

4 MR. OLSON: The label is like --

5 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Same-sex couples
6 have every other right, it's just about the label.

7 MR. OLSON: The label "marriage" means
8 something. Even our opponents --

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Sure. If you
10 tell -- if you tell a child that somebody has to be
11 their friend, I suppose you can force the child to say,
12 this is my friend, but it changes the definition of what
13 it means to be a friend.

14 And that's it seems to me what the -- what
15 supporters of Proposition 8 are saying here. You're --
16 all you're interested in is the label and you insist on
17 changing the definition of the label.

18 MR. OLSON: It is like you were to say you
19 can vote, you can travel, but you may not be a citizen.
20 There are certain labels in this country that are very,
21 very critical. You could have said in the Loving case,
22 what -- you can't get married, but you can have an
23 interracial union. Everyone would know that that was
24 wrong. That the -- marriage has a status, recognition,
25 support, and you -- if you read the test -- you know --

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: How do we know --
2 how do we know that that's the reason, or a necessary
3 part of the reason, that we've recognized marriage as a
4 fundamental right? That's -- you've emphasized that and
5 you've said, well, it's because of the emotional
6 commitment. Maybe it is the procreative aspect that
7 makes it a fundamental right.

8 MR. OLSON: But you have said that marriage
9 is a fundamental right with respect to procreation and
10 at the same level getting married, privacy -- you said
11 that in the Zablocki case, you said that in the Lawrence
12 case, and you said it in other cases, the Skinner case,
13 for example.

14 Marriage is put on a pro -- equal footing
15 with procreational aspects. And your -- this Court is
16 the one that has said over and over again that marriage
17 means something to the individual. The privacy,
18 intimacy, and that it is a matter of status and
19 recognition in this --

20 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Mr. Olson, the bottom
21 line that you're being asked -- and -- and it is one
22 that I'm interested in the answer, if you say that
23 marriage is a fundamental right, what State restrictions
24 could ever exist? Meaning, what State restrictions with
25 respect to the number of people, with respect to -- that

1 could get married -- the incest laws, the mother and
2 child, assuming that they are the age -- I can -- I can
3 accept that the State has probably an overbearing
4 interest on -- on protecting a child until they're of
5 age to marry, but what's left?

6 MR. OLSON: Well, you've said -- you've said
7 in the cases decided by this Court that the polygamy
8 issue, multiple marriages raises questions about
9 exploitation, abuse, patriarchy, issues with respect to
10 taxes, inheritance, child custody, it is an entirely
11 different thing. And if you -- if a State prohibits
12 polygamy, it's prohibiting conduct.

13 If it prohibits gay and lesbian citizens
14 from getting married, it is prohibiting their exercise
15 of a right based upon their status. It's selecting them
16 as a class, as you described in the Romer case and as
17 you described in the Lawrence case and in other cases,
18 you're picking out a group of individuals to deny them
19 the freedom that you've said is fundamental, important,
20 and vital in this society, and it has status and
21 stature, as you pointed out in the VMI case. There's
22 a -- there's a different --

23 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: Is there any way to
24 decide this case in a principled manner that is limited
25 to California only?

1 MR. OLSON: Yes, the Ninth Circuit did that.
2 You can decide the standing case that limits it to the
3 decision of the district court here. You could decide
4 it as the Ninth Circuit did --

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: The problem -- the problem
6 with the case is that you're really asking, particularly
7 because of the sociological evidence you cite, for us to
8 go into uncharted waters, and you can play with that
9 metaphor, there's a wonderful destination, it is a
10 cliff. Whatever that was.

11 (Laughter.)

12 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But you're -- you're doing
13 so in a -- in a case where the opinion is very narrow.
14 Basically that once the State goes halfway, it has to go
15 all the way or 70 percent of the way, and you're doing
16 so in a case where there's a substantial question on --
17 on standing. I just wonder if -- if the case was
18 properly granted.

19 MR. OLSON: Oh, the case was certainly
20 properly granted, Your Honor. I mean, there was a full
21 trial of all of these issues. There was a 12-day trial.
22 The judge insisted on evidence on all of these
23 questions. This -- this is a --

24 JUSTICE KENNEDY: But that's not the issue
25 the Ninth Circuit decided.

1 MR. OLSON: The issue -- yes, the Ninth
2 Circuit looked at it and decided because of your
3 decision on the Romer case -- this Court's decision on
4 the Romer case, that it could be decided on the narrower
5 issue, but it certainly was an appropriate case to
6 grant. And those issues that I've been describing are
7 certainly fundamental to the case. And -- and I don't
8 want to abuse the Court's indulgence, that what I -- you
9 suggested that this is uncharted waters. It was
10 uncharted waters when this Court, in 1967, in the Loving
11 decision said that interracial -- prohibitions
12 on interracial marriages, which still existed in 16
13 States, were unconstitutional.

14 JUSTICE KENNEDY: It was hundreds of years
15 old in the common law countries. This was new to the
16 United States.

17 MR. OLSON: And -- and what we have here --

18 JUSTICE KENNEDY: So -- so that's not
19 accurate.

20 MR. OLSON: I -- I respectfully submit that
21 we've under -- we've learned to understand more about
22 sexual orientation and what it means to individuals. I
23 guess the -- the language that Justice Ginsburg used at
24 the closing of the VMI case is an important thing, it
25 resonates with me, "A prime part of the history of our

1 Constitution is the story of the extension of
2 constitutional rights to people once ignored or
3 excluded."

4 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel.
5 General Verrilli?

6 ORAL ARGUMENT OF DONALD B. VERRILLI, JR.,
7 FOR UNITED STATES, AS AMICUS CURIAE,
8 SUPPORTING THE RESPONDENTS

9 GENERAL VERRILLI: Mr. Chief Justice, and
10 may it please the Court:

11 Proposition 8 denies gay and lesbian persons
12 the equal protection of the laws --

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You don't think
14 you're going to get away with not starting with the
15 jurisdictional question, do you?

16 (Laughter.)

17 GENERAL VERRILLI: As an amicus, I thought I
18 might actually, Your Honor. And -- and, of course, we
19 didn't take a position on standing. We didn't -- we
20 didn't brief it. We don't have a formal position on
21 standing, but I will offer this observation based on the
22 discussion today and the briefing.

23 We do think that, while it's certainly not
24 free of doubt, that the better argument is that there is
25 not Article III standing here because -- I don't want to

1 go beyond just summarizing our position, but -- because
2 we don't have a formal position.

3 But we do think that with respect to
4 standing, that at this point with the initiative process
5 over, that Petitioners really have what is more in the
6 nature of a generalized grievance and because they're
7 not an agent of the State of California or don't have
8 any other official tie to the State that would -- would
9 result in any official control of their litigation, that
10 the better conclusion is that there's not Article III
11 standing here.

12 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, tomorrow you're going
13 to be making a standing argument that some parties think
14 is rather tenuous, but today, you're -- you're very
15 strong for Article III standing?

16 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, we said this was
17 a -- we said this was a close question, and -- and our
18 interests are, Justice Alito, in tomorrow's issues where
19 we have briefed the matter thoroughly and will be
20 prepared to discuss it with the Court tomorrow.

21 With respect to the merits, two fundamental
22 points lead to the conclusion that there's an equal
23 protection violation here. First, every warning flag
24 that warrants exacting scrutiny is present in this case.
25 And Petitioners' defense of Proposition 8 requires the

1 Court to ignore those warning flags and instead apply
2 highly deferential Lee Optical rational basis review as
3 though Proposition 8 were on a par with the law of
4 treating opticians less favorably than optometrists,
5 when it really is the polar opposite of such a law.

6 JUSTICE GINSBURG: General Verrilli, I could
7 understand your argument if you were talking about the
8 entire United States, but you -- your brief says it's
9 only eight or nine States, the States that permit civil
10 unions, and that's -- brings up a question that was
11 asked before. So a State that has made considerable
12 progress has to go all the way, but at least the
13 government's position is, if it has done -- the State
14 has done absolutely nothing at all, then it's -- it can
15 do -- do as it will.

16 GENERAL VERRILLI: I -- that gets to my
17 second point, Your Honor, which is that I do think the
18 problem here with the arguments that Petitioners are
19 advancing is that California's own laws do cut the legs
20 out from under all of the justifications that
21 Petitioners have offered in defense of Proposition 8.
22 And I understand Your Honor's point and the point that
23 Justice Kennedy raised earlier, but I do think this
24 Court's equal protection jurisprudence requires the
25 Court to evaluate the interests that the State puts

1 forward, not in a vacuum, but in the context of the
2 actual substance of California law.

3 And here, with respect to California law,
4 gay and lesbian couples do have the legal rights and
5 benefits of marriage, full equality and adoption, full
6 access to assistive reproduction, and therefore, the
7 argument about the State's interests that -- that
8 Petitioners advance have to be tested against that
9 reality, and -- and they just don't measure up. None of
10 the --

11 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, the argument --

12 JUSTICE ALITO: None of the --

13 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Justice Breyer.

14 JUSTICE BREYER: What is the one -- look, a
15 State that does nothing for gay couples hurts them much
16 more than a State that does something. And, of course,
17 it's true that it does hurt their argument that they do
18 quite a lot, but which are their good arguments, in your
19 opinion? I mean, take a State that really does nothing
20 whatsoever.

21 They have no benefits, no nothing, no
22 nothing. Okay? And moreover, if -- if you're right,
23 even in California, if they have -- if they're right
24 or -- you know, if a pact is enough, they won't get
25 Federal benefits. Those that are tied to marriage

1 because they're not married. So -- so a State that does
2 nothing hurts them much more, and yet your brief seems
3 to say it's more likely to be justified under the
4 Constitution.

5 I'd like to know with some specificity how
6 that could be.

7 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, because you have to
8 measure the -- under the standard of equal protection
9 scrutiny that we think this Court's cases require.

10 JUSTICE BREYER: I know the principle, but
11 I'm saying which are their good arguments, in your
12 opinion, that would be good enough to overcome for the
13 State that does nothing, but not good enough to overcome
14 California where they do a lot?

15 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, we -- what we're --
16 what we're saying about that is that we're not prepared
17 to close the door to an argument in another State where
18 the State's interests haven't cut the legs out from
19 under the arguments. And I think -- I suppose the
20 caution rationale that Mr. Cooper identified with
21 respect to the effects on children, if it came up in a
22 different case with a different record, after all here,
23 this case was litigated by Petitioners on the theory
24 that rational basis applied and they didn't need to show
25 anything and so they didn't try to show anything.

1 Our view is that heightened scrutiny should
2 apply and so I don't want to -- I don't want to kid
3 about this, we understand, that would be a very heavy
4 burden for a State to meet. All we're suggesting is
5 that in a situation in which the -- the State interests
6 aren't cut out from under it, as they -- as they are
7 here, that that issue ought to remain open for a future
8 case. And I -- and I think the caution rationale would
9 be the one place where we might leave it open. But you
10 can't leave it open in this case.

11 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: General, there is an
12 irony in that, which is the States that do more have
13 less rights.

14 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well -- well, I
15 understand that, Your Honor, but I do think that you
16 have to think about the claim of right on the other side
17 of the equation here. And in this situation,
18 California -- the argument here that -- that gay and
19 lesbian couples can be denied access to marriage on the
20 ground of an interest in responsible procreation and
21 child rearing just can't stand up given that the parents
22 have full equality, the gay and lesbian parents have
23 full equality apart from --

24 JUSTICE ALITO: You want us to assess the
25 effects of same-sex marriage, the potential effects

1 on -- of same-sex marriage, the potential -- the effects
2 of Proposition 8. But what is your response to the
3 argument, which has already been mentioned about the
4 need to be cautious in light of the newness of the --
5 the concept of -- of same-sex marriage?

6 The one thing that the parties in this case
7 seem to agree on is that marriage is very important.
8 It's thought to be a fundamental building block of
9 society and its preservation essential for the
10 preservation of society. Traditional marriage has been
11 around for thousands of years. Same-sex marriage is
12 very new. I think it was first adopted in The
13 Netherlands in 2000. So there isn't a lot of data about
14 its effect. And it may turn out to be a -- a good
15 thing. It may turn out not to be a good thing, as the
16 supporters of Proposition 8 apparently believe.

17 But you want us to step in and render a
18 decision based on an assessment of the effects of this
19 institution, which is newer than cell phones or the
20 Internet? I mean we -- we are not -- we do not have the
21 ability to see the future.

22 On a question like that, of such fundamental
23 importance, why should it not be left for the people,
24 either acting through initiatives and referendums or
25 through their elected public officials?

1 GENERAL VERRILLI: I have four points I
2 would like to make to that in response to that,
3 Justice Alito, and I think they are all important.

4 First, California did not, through
5 Proposition 8, do what my friend Mr. Cooper said and
6 push a pause button. They pushed a delete button. This
7 is a permanent ban. It's in the Constitution. It's
8 supposed to take this issue out from the legislative
9 process. So that's the first point.

10 Second --

11 JUSTICE ALITO: Well, just in response to
12 that, of course the Constitution could be amended,
13 and -- and I think I read that the California
14 Constitution has been amended 500 times.

15 GENERAL VERRILLI: But the --

16 JUSTICE ALITO: So it's not exactly like the
17 U.S. Constitution.

18 GENERAL VERRILLI: But it does -- of course
19 not. But it is -- but the aim of this is to take it out
20 of the normal legislative process.

21 The second point is that, with respect to
22 concerns that Your Honor has raised, California has been
23 anything but cautious. It has given equal parenting
24 rights, equal adoption rights. Those rights are on the
25 books in California now and so the interest of

1 California is -- that Petitioners are articulating, with
2 respect to Proposition 8, has to be measured in that
3 light.

4 JUSTICE SCALIA: Yeah, but the rest of the
5 country has been cautious.

6 GENERAL VERRILLI: And -- and that's why --

7 JUSTICE SCALIA: And we're -- and you are
8 asking us to impose this on the whole country, not just
9 California.

10 GENERAL VERRILLI: No, respectfully
11 Justice Scalia, we are not. Our position is narrower
12 than that. Our position -- the position we have taken,
13 is about States, it applies to States that have, like
14 California and perhaps other States, that have granted
15 these rights short of marriage, but --

16 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: I don't want to -- I
17 want you to get back to Justice Alito's other points,
18 but is it the position of the United States that
19 same-sex marriage is not required throughout the
20 country?

21 GENERAL VERRILLI: We are not -- we are not
22 taking the position that it is required throughout the
23 country. We think that that ought to be left open for a
24 future adjudication in other States that don't have the
25 situation California has.

1 JUSTICE SCALIA: So your -- your position is
2 only if a State allows civil unions does it become
3 unconstitutional to forbid same-sex marriage, right?

4 GENERAL VERRILLI: I -- I see my red light
5 is on.

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Well, you can go on.

7 GENERAL VERRILLI: Thank you.

8 Our position is -- I would just take out a
9 red pen and take the word "only" out of that sentence.
10 When that is true, then the Equal Protection Clause
11 forbids the exclusion of same-sex marriage and it's an
12 open question otherwise.

13 And if I could just get to the third reason,
14 which I do think is quite significant.

15 The -- the argument here about caution is an
16 argument that, well, we need to wait. We understand
17 that. We take it seriously. But waiting is not a
18 neutral act. Waiting imposes real costs in the here and
19 now. It denies to the -- to the parents who want to
20 marry the ability to marry, and it denies to the
21 children, ironically, the very thing that Petitioners
22 focus on is at the heart of the marriage relationship.

23 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you are willing
24 to wait in the rest of the country. You saying it's got
25 to happen right now in California, but you don't even

1 have a position about whether it's required in the rest
2 of the country.

3 GENERAL VERRILLI: It -- if, with respect to
4 a State that allows gay couples to have children and to
5 have families and then denies the stabilizing effect --

6 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: So it's got to
7 happen right away in those States where same-sex couples
8 have every legal right that married couples do.

9 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, we think --

10 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you can wait in
11 States where they have fewer legal rights.

12 GENERAL VERRILLI: What I said is it's an
13 open question with respect to those States and the Court
14 should wait and see what kind of a record a State could
15 make. But in California you can't make the record to
16 justify the exclusion.

17 And the fourth point I would make on this,
18 recognizing that these situations are not --

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: How would the record be
20 different elsewhere?

21 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, they might try to
22 make a different record about the effects on children.
23 But there isn't a record to that effect here.

24 And the fourth point I would make, and I do
25 think this is significant, is that the principal

1 argument in 1967, with respect to Loving and that the
2 Commonwealth of Virginia advanced was, well, the social
3 science is still uncertain about how biracial children
4 will fare in this world, and so you ought to apply
5 rational basis scrutiny and wait. And I think the Court
6 recognized that there is a cost to waiting and that that
7 has got to be part of the equal protection calculus.
8 And so -- so I do think that's quite fundamental.

9 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Can I ask you a
10 problem about --

11 GENERAL VERRILLI: Sure.

12 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: -- I -- it seems to
13 me that your position that you are supporting is
14 somewhat internally inconsistent. We see the argument
15 made that there is no problem with extending marriage to
16 same-sex couples because children raised by same-sex
17 couples are doing just fine and there is no evidence
18 that they are being harmed.

19 And the other argument is Proposition 8
20 harms children by not allowing same-sex couples to
21 marriage. Which is it?

22 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, I -- I think what
23 Proposition 8 does is deny the long-term stabilizing
24 effect that marriage brings. That's -- that's the
25 argument for -- for marriage, that --

1 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: But you also tell me
2 there has been no harm shown to children of same-sex
3 couples.

4 GENERAL VERRILLI: California -- there are
5 37,000 children in same-sex families in California now.
6 Their parents cannot marry and that has effects on them
7 in the here and now.

8 A stabilizing effect is not there. When
9 they go to school, they have to -- you know -- they
10 don't have parents like everybody else's parents.
11 That's a real effect, a real cost in the here and now.

12 JUSTICE BREYER: Well, the real cost right
13 now would be you're asking me to write these words, "a
14 State that has a pact has to say 'marriage,'" but I'm
15 not telling you about States that don't. Well, I would
16 guess there is a real-world effect there, too. That
17 States that are considering pacts will all say, we won't
18 do it, or not all, but some would.

19 And that would have a real effect right now.
20 And at the moment, I'm thinking it's much more harmful
21 to the gay couple, the latter than the former. But you
22 won't give me advice as the government as to how to deal
23 with that.

24 GENERAL VERRILLI: Well, we -- we think
25 that, as I started my argument, Your Honor, that all the

1 warning flags for exacting equal protection scrutiny are
2 present here. This is a group that has suffered a
3 history of terrible discrimination. The Petitioners
4 don't deny it.

5 Petitioners said at the podium today that
6 there is no justification for that discrimination in any
7 realm other than the one posed in this case and the --
8 and so when those two factors are present, those are
9 paradigm considerations for the application of
10 heightened scrutiny, and so I don't want to suggest that
11 the States that haven't taken those steps --

12 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: But they are not the
13 only ones.

14 GENERAL VERRILLI: -- that States that
15 haven't taken this step, that they are going to have an
16 easy time meeting heightened scrutiny, which I think has
17 to apply --

18 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Suppose -- suppose one of
19 those States repeals its civil union laws?

20 GENERAL VERRILLI: It would be a different
21 case. And all I'm saying is that the door ought to
22 remain open to that case, not that it would be easy for
23 the State to prevail in that case.

24 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, General.

25 Mr. Cooper, to keep things fair, I think you

1 have 10 minutes.

2 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT OF CHARLES J. COOPER

3 ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS

4 MR. COOPER: Thank you very much.

5 JUSTICE KENNEDY: And you might address why
6 you think we should take and decide this case.

7 MR. COOPER: Yes, Your Honor, and that is
8 the one thing on which I wholeheartedly agree with my
9 friend Mr. Olson. This case was properly -- is now
10 properly before the Court and was properly granted, even
11 if, even if, Your Honor, one could defend the -- the
12 specific judgment below for the Ninth Circuit, a defense
13 that I haven't heard offered to this Court. Judicial
14 redefinition of marriage even in -- even if it can be
15 limited to California, is well worthy of this Court's
16 attention, particularly, Your Honor, as it come from a
17 single district court judge in a single jurisdiction.

18 I would also like --

19 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: I think that begs
20 your -- Mr. Olson doesn't really focus on this. If the
21 issue is letting the States experiment and letting the
22 society have more time to figure out its direction, why
23 is taking a case now the answer?

24 MR. COOPER: Because, Your Honor --

25 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: We let issues perk and

1 so we let racial segregation perk for 50 years from 1898
2 to 1954.

3 MR. COOPER: Your Honor, it is hard to --

4 JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR: And now we are only
5 talking about, at most, four years.

6 MR. COOPER: It is hard to imagine a case
7 that would be better, or more thoroughly, I should say,
8 at least, briefed and argued to this Court.

9 JUSTICE SCALIA: It's too late for that, too
10 late for that now, isn't it? I mean, we granted cert.
11 I mean, that's essentially asking -- you know, why did
12 we grant cert. We should let it percolate for
13 another -- you know, we -- we have crossed that river, I
14 think.

15 MR. COOPER: And in this particular case, to
16 not grant certiorari is to essentially bless a judicial
17 decision that there -- that at least in the State of
18 California, the people have no authority to step back,
19 hit the pause button, and allow the experiments that are
20 taking place in this country to further mature. That in
21 fact, at least in California -- and it's impossible to
22 limit this ruling, Your Honor, even to California, even
23 the Solicitor General's argument, he says, applies to at
24 least eight States.

25 It's impossible to limit these -- these

1 propositions to any particular jurisdiction, so this
2 Court would be making a very real decision with respect
3 to same-sex marriage if it should simply decide to
4 dismiss the writ as improvidently granted,
5 Justice Kennedy.

6 And let's -- let's just step back and just
7 consider for a moment the Solicitor General's argument.
8 He is basically submitting to the Court that essentially
9 the one compromise that is not available to the States
10 is the one that the State of California has undertaken.
11 That is, to go as far as the people possibly can in --
12 in honoring and recognizing the families and the
13 relationships of same-sex couples, while still
14 preserving the existence of traditional marriage as an
15 institution. That's the one thing that's off the table.

16 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I thought he was saying
17 -- I thought he was saying, Mr. Cooper, that it's not
18 before the Court today. And remember Loving against
19 Virginia was preceded by the McLaughlin case. So first
20 there was the question of no marriage, and then there
21 was marriage.

22 So in that sense I understood the Solicitor
23 General to be telling us that case is not before the
24 Court today.

25 MR. COOPER: Forgive me, Justice Ginsburg.

1 The case of -- what case isn't before the Court?

2 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I think it was McLaughlin
3 v. Florida.

4 MR. COOPER: Yes.

5 JUSTICE GINSBURG: It was cohabitation of
6 people of different races.

7 MR. COOPER: Certainly.

8 JUSTICE GINSBURG: And the Court took that
9 case and waited to reach the marriage case.

10 MR. COOPER: It's -- yes, Your Honor. And
11 well, forgive me, Your Honor. I'm not sure -- I'm not
12 sure I'm following the Court's question.

13 JUSTICE GINSBURG: I may -- my memory may be
14 wrong, but I think the case was that people of different
15 races were arrested and charged with the crime of
16 interracial cohabitation. And the Court said that that
17 was invalid.

18 MR. COOPER: Yes.

19 JUSTICE GINSBURG: Unlawful.

20 MR. COOPER: Yes. Thank you, Your Honor.

21 Forgive me. And -- you know, I'm glad that counsel for
22 the Respondents mentioned the Loving case because what
23 this Court -- what this Court ultimately said was
24 patently obvious, is that the colors of the skin of the
25 spouses is irrelevant to any legitimate purpose, no more

1 so than their hair colors, any legitimate purpose of
2 marriage, that interracial couples and same-race couples
3 are similarly situated in every respect with respect to
4 any legitimate purpose of marriage.

5 That's what this question really boils down
6 here, whether or not it can be said that for every
7 legitimate purpose of marriage, are opposite-sex couples
8 and same-sex couples indistinguishable?
9 Indistinguishable. And with all due respect to counsel
10 and to the Respondents, that is not a hard question.

11 If, in fact, it is true, as the people of
12 California believe that it still is true, that the
13 natural procreative capacity of opposite-sex couples
14 continues to pose vitally important benefits and risks
15 to society and that's why marriage itself is the
16 institution that society has always used to regulate
17 those heterosexual, procreative -- procreative
18 relationships.

19 Counsel -- the Solicitor General has said
20 that -- that the ban that the proposition erects in
21 California is permanent. Well, it's -- certainly that
22 is not the view of the Respondents and what we read
23 every day. This is not an issue that is now at rest in
24 the State of California, regardless -- well, unless this
25 Court essentially puts it to rest. That democratic

1 debate, which is roiling throughout this country, will
2 definitely be coming back to California.

3 It is an agonizingly difficult, for many
4 people, political question. We would submit to you that
5 that question is properly decided by the people
6 themselves.

7 Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice.

8 CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: Thank you, counsel,
9 counsel.

10 The case is submitted.

11 (Whereupon, at 11:27 a.m., the case in the
12 above-entitled matter was submitted.)

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A				
abiding 24:1	38:15 39:1	65:19	appointed 9:10	aspects 37:14
ability 5:22 36:23	56:12	allowed 6:11	9:15 30:24 34:1	46:15
56:21 59:20	adopting 20:7	44:8	appointee 30:25	assess 55:24
able 5:24 40:21	adoption 19:12	allowing 23:1,3	appointment	assessment
41:21	19:17 23:8,17	61:20	34:18,22	56:18
above-entitled	44:23 53:5	allows 30:1 59:2	appoints 31:12	assign 5:12,21
1:11 69:12	57:24	60:4	appropriate 49:5	38:22 39:17
absolutely 39:1	adoptions 43:25	amended 57:12	arbitrarily 16:3	assistive 53:6
52:14	adult 24:5	57:14	arbitrary 16:9	association
abuse 47:9 49:8	adults 24:5	amendment 9:18	argued 65:8	36:17 42:15
accept 22:23,24	advance 17:23	38:15	argues 37:11	assume 11:14
29:19 47:3	53:8	amici 7:23 34:11	arguing 20:12	22:22
accepted 3:12	advanced 61:2	amicus 1:21 2:10	43:16 44:16	assuming 47:2
11:24,24	advances 22:16	50:7,17	argument 1:12	assumption
access 53:6	25:11	amorphous	2:2,5,8,12 3:3,6	34:13
55:19	advancing 52:19	15:15	9:14 11:2 16:14	assure 25:2
accident 15:18	adverse 18:17	answer 19:21,21	16:15 22:23,24	attention 64:16
accurate 49:19	advertising 43:7	20:18 26:21	23:20 28:12	attorney 4:23 8:7
accurately 18:14	43:10	34:17 38:19	29:11,13,19	8:8,12 30:6,18
acknowledge	advice 62:22	42:5,17 46:22	34:3,24,25 35:2	30:19 31:13
13:1	afford 22:18	64:23	39:22 41:5	attorneys 31:18
acknowledged	age 24:12,18,22	answering 34:10	42:21 50:6,24	33:24
18:12	25:3,24,25 26:2	answers 12:7	51:13 52:7 53:7	authorities 4:18
act 7:2,4 30:7	26:11,14 47:2,5	37:16	53:11,17 54:17	11:15
59:18	agent 11:7 51:7	anti-gay 13:11	55:18 56:3	authority 4:20
acted 39:13	age-old 12:3	anybody 5:22	59:15,16 61:1	6:18 8:17 65:18
acting 56:24	18:20	anymore 24:12	61:14,19,25	authorize 6:7
action 10:7,7,7	ago 42:4	apart 55:23	62:25 64:2	available 66:9
10:12,15,23	agonizingly	apparently 56:16	65:23 66:7	avoid 29:5
actual 32:9 53:2	12:10 69:3	appeal 10:3	arguments 11:6	await 19:5
addition 4:17	agree 14:3 56:7	29:24	21:4 43:21 44:2	a.m 1:13 3:2
11:12	64:8	APPEARANC...	44:20,23 52:18	69:11
additional 19:5	agreed 13:22	1:14	53:18 54:11,19	
37:12	22:4	appellate 13:20	arrested 67:15	B
address 7:2	aim 57:19	application 63:9	Article 6:9 8:24	B 1:17,19 2:6,9
17:11 18:7	AL 1:3,6	applied 37:14	29:14 32:2 34:7	28:12 50:6
29:11 64:5	Alito 30:15 32:18	54:24	50:25 51:10,15	back 15:8 58:17
addressed 9:13	43:13 44:10	applies 20:13	articulating 58:1	65:18 66:6 69:2
addressing 28:17	51:12,18 53:12	21:1 58:13	asked 25:23	background 7:11
31:24	55:24 57:3,11	65:23	46:21 52:11	Baker 12:14,17
adjudication	57:16	apply 23:17,19	asking 26:1 48:6	12:24 13:2
58:24	Alito's 58:17	52:1 55:2 61:4	58:8 62:13	38:16
adopt 44:5	allocated 32:6	63:17	65:11	ballot 3:25 4:7
adopted 30:17	allow 17:2 20:14	appoint 31:4 35:9	aspect 36:22	7:12,12 8:3
	23:8 33:6 41:12	35:10	46:6	18:19 29:16

<p>30:17,18,20 34:23 ban 57:7 68:20 bare 13:12 based 13:24 28:24 39:10 41:7 42:12 47:15 50:21 56:18 basically 16:20 42:23 48:14 66:8 basis 14:9 20:22 22:13 52:2 54:24 61:5 bedrock 18:20 18:24 begs 64:19 behalf 1:15,17 2:4,7,14 3:7 28:13 33:24,25 36:5 44:2 64:3 believe 13:13 17:20 19:1 20:15 56:16 68:12 beneficial 22:6 benefits 14:10 14:13 43:14,18 53:5,21,25 68:14 best 3:16 30:7 better 19:4 33:4 44:8 50:24 51:10 65:7 beyond 20:23 32:24 51:1 binary 32:7 biracial 61:3 birth 15:18 bit 17:13 bless 65:16 block 56:8 body 34:23 boils 68:5</p>	<p>books 57:25 booth 18:19 bottom 15:4 32:11,17 46:20 bound 32:18 36:1 Breyer 10:5,11 22:21 23:12,16 35:8,22 53:11 53:13,14 54:10 62:12 brief 11:1 21:18 29:14 34:11 35:8,17 50:20 52:8 54:2 briefed 51:19 65:8 briefing 50:22 briefs 16:14 17:14 bring 6:10,10 brings 52:10 61:24 broad 42:21 brought 3:23 9:18 27:11 building 56:8 built 34:19 burden 55:4 burdens 14:11 button 19:5 57:6 57:6 65:19 Byrd 32:13</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">C</p> <hr/> <p>C 2:1 3:1 cabin 21:4 calculus 61:7 Californians 28:23 40:20 California's 44:3 52:19 called 10:6 campaign 30:14 capacities 25:8 capacity 68:13</p>	<p>capricious 16:9 carefully 5:19 case 3:4,10 5:8 6:25 7:18 9:18 10:13 21:20 27:17,21 28:2 30:13 31:8,24 32:4,4 33:14 37:17 39:19 40:10,11,15,24 40:24 41:22 42:11,21 43:6 43:10,10,17,19 44:11 45:3,21 46:11,12,12 47:16,17,21,24 48:2,6,13,16 48:17,19 49:3,4 49:5,7,24 51:24 54:22,23 55:8 55:10 56:6 63:7 63:21,22,23 64:6,9,23 65:6 65:15 66:19,23 67:1,1,9,9,14 67:22 69:10,11 cases 36:19 46:12 47:7,17 54:9 casinos 43:7 cause 17:17 caution 54:20 55:8 59:15 cautious 56:4 57:23 58:5 cell 56:19 cert 65:10,12 certain 32:6 35:5 44:20,21 45:20 certainly 4:6 6:21 12:25 14:25 20:3,17 21:22 22:1 23:9 48:19 49:5,7 50:23 67:7</p>	<p>68:21 certiorari 65:16 chairman 26:5 challenged 8:16 change 37:24 changed 12:4 changes 40:14 45:12 changing 12:1,1 45:17 characteristic 40:3 characteristics 42:13,14 charged 67:15 CHARLES 1:15 2:3,13 3:6 64:2 cherished 28:25 Chief 3:3,8,14,18 6:2,5,23,24 11:19 22:17 26:20 28:8,10 28:11,14 29:2,7 29:9 31:19 36:8 36:25 37:16,19 37:23 40:23 41:5 45:2,5,9 46:1 50:4,9,13 53:13 58:16 59:6,23 60:6,10 61:9,12 62:1 63:24 69:7,8 child 19:15,16,22 20:7 27:9 45:10 45:11 47:2,4,10 55:21 childbirth 28:2 children 21:16 21:17,20 23:3,7 23:23 24:4 25:4 27:10 28:7 38:22 44:6 54:21 59:21 60:4,22 61:3,16 61:20 62:2,5</p>	<p>child-rearing 43:25 44:24 choose 33:11 Circuit 42:23 48:1,4,25 49:2 64:12 circumstances 8:14 circumvent 33:7 cite 48:7 citizen 5:12,17 5:25 6:20 7:7 9:22 10:8 45:19 citizenry 4:11 citizens 6:22 10:20 31:2 39:10 40:16 47:13 civil 41:13 52:9 59:2 63:19 claim 55:16 claims 6:10 class 14:19,20 14:22 15:11,14 15:23 28:23 39:10 42:12 47:16 classification 13:14,20,23 14:4,5 41:7 classifications 12:19 class-based 43:22 Clause 39:1 59:10 Clauses 38:5 clear 4:3 6:21 23:12 clearly 14:4 20:22 cliff 48:10 close 34:4 51:17 54:17 closing 49:24</p>
---	--	---	---	---

<p>code 4:15 cohabitation 27:6 67:5,16 colleagues 30:23 colors 67:24 68:1 come 15:8 25:16 35:6 43:19,20 44:21,22 64:16 comes 44:20 coming 25:4 69:2 commitment 27:7,8 46:6 committee 26:5 common 49:15 Commonwealth 61:2 companies 23:4 compelling 14:23 compromise 66:9 conceding 18:1,3 18:5 concept 56:5 concern 4:6 23:24 concerned 17:7 concerns 21:6 57:22 conclusion 22:11 51:10,22 concrete 19:9,10 conduct 12:23 27:1 47:12 conducting 19:4 confined 21:7 confirmed 26:6 conflict 31:13 conflicts 35:16 36:4 Congress 32:13 32:14,15 connection 24:1 29:16 consequences 18:13,15,16,17 19:14</p>	<p>consider 18:18 66:7 considerable 19:13 52:11 consideration 21:23,24 considerations 63:9 considered 12:23 considering 62:17 consistent 15:15 Constitution 4:14 6:9 10:13 11:11 12:6 32:20 36:20 38:6 40:14 50:1 54:4 57:7,12,14 57:17 constitutional 9:18 12:12 24:13,15 30:1 39:11 40:1 50:2 constitutionality 32:23 33:12 consummation 28:6 context 8:19 9:14 14:8 27:23 28:5 28:19 32:14 43:6,8,12,24 53:1 continue 21:25 22:19 continues 68:14 control 9:25 11:17 40:3 51:9 controversy 10:13 Cooper 1:15 2:3 2:13 3:5,6,8,14 3:17 4:1,13 5:1 5:4,7,10,14,23 6:4,13 7:8,15 8:5,9,12,23 9:8</p>	<p>9:12 10:10 11:9 11:21 12:17,21 12:25 13:15,18 14:15,25 15:25 16:13,21 17:5 17:19 18:4,9 19:8,23 20:2,5 20:8,19,25 21:3 21:22 22:17,20 23:11,15,24 24:9,14,21 25:6 26:1,8,12,15 26:23 27:12,16 27:19 28:9,10 54:20 57:5 63:25 64:2,4,7 64:24 65:3,6,15 66:17,25 67:4,7 67:10,18,20 correct 12:8 16:20 17:20,21 cost 61:6 62:11 62:12 costs 59:18 counsel 11:19 31:9 37:1 50:4 67:21 68:9,19 69:8,9 counterintuitive 7:23 countries 49:15 country 12:1,2 45:20 58:5,8,20 58:23 59:24 60:2 65:20 69:1 couple 24:12,23 25:2,8 26:10,13 26:16 27:4,5 37:15 62:21 couples 12:4 13:9 14:5 15:6 15:6 16:16,17 16:18,25 17:2 17:17,23 18:2 19:11,12,17</p>	<p>20:6,14 23:2,4 23:22 24:6,22 24:23 37:7 38:14 42:25 43:18 45:5 53:4 53:15 55:19 60:4,7,8 61:16 61:17,20 62:3 66:13 68:2,2,7 68:8,13 course 7:8 10:15 35:9 50:18 53:16 57:12,18 court 1:1,12 3:9 3:10,21 4:1,2,3 4:17 5:16 6:8 7:16,19 8:16 9:13,20 10:12 11:10,25 12:5 12:13,14,18 13:21 17:21 25:20 28:3,3,15 28:19,23 30:5 30:11 32:12,12 33:13,17,18 34:5 35:7 36:14 37:21,25 38:2,3 38:4,10 39:8,18 39:21 40:17 41:1,8 42:2,6 42:22 43:5 46:15 47:7 48:3 49:10 50:10 51:20 52:1,25 60:13 61:5 64:10,13,17 65:8 66:2,8,18 66:24 67:1,8,16 67:23,23 68:25 Court's 8:25 15:12 16:5 49:3 49:8 52:24 54:9 64:15 67:12 create 7:13 16:7 29:14</p>	<p>crime 67:15 criminal 12:23 critical 45:21 crossed 65:13 culture 40:2 curiae 1:21 2:10 50:7 curious 38:12 custody 47:10 cut 29:2 52:19 54:18 55:6 cycle 40:8</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">D</p> <hr/> <p>D 3:1 data 22:3,5,10 56:13 date 39:18 40:7 40:14 day 68:23 days 37:20 deal 62:22 dealing 15:22 27:25 debate 12:2,7 20:23 69:1 debated 21:25 22:1,1 decide 5:24 33:18 35:4,6 38:11,12 40:10 41:22 47:24 48:2,3 64:6 66:3 decided 12:18 27:22 32:12 36:6 38:4 39:19 40:16,17,18,20 41:8,24,25 42:2 47:7 48:25 49:2 49:4 69:5 decides 38:3,10 decision 13:3 14:14 37:17,21 39:8 41:1,15</p>
---	---	---	--	--

<p>42:1 44:3 48:3 49:3,3,11 56:18 65:17 66:2 decisions 8:25 34:7 44:19,25 decision-making 14:12 decline 6:18 declined9:16,16 default 34:6 defeated33:2 defend 3:20,22 4:21 5:2,6,12 8:14 9:16 11:15 29:15 30:16 31:5 32:23 33:3 33:11 34:14 64:11 defended34:16 defending 21:1 35:14,14 defends 35:11 defense 29:21,21 51:25 52:21 64:12 deferential 52:2 defies 15:15 defined41:9 definitely 69:2 definition 6:8 12:3 13:8,10 15:15 16:12 24:3 45:12,17 delegate 7:24 8:1 delete 57:6 deleterious 20:1 Dellinger 10:25 democratic 12:6 68:25 denied55:19 denies 50:11 59:19,20 60:5 denigration 18:1 DENNIS 1:3 deny 47:18 61:23</p>	<p>63:4 denying 14:10,13 44:17 Department 1:20 depleted32:14 described36:19 36:21 47:16,17 describing 49:6 designate 8:21 designating 29:15 designed9:25 11:17 26:23 desire 13:12 desires 24:5 desk 25:16 destination 48:9 destroyed28:4 detailed5:19 determined40:2 developed37:3,6 different 7:6 16:1 23:4 24:20 28:25 30:2 32:4 40:24 44:13 47:11,22 54:22 54:22 60:20,22 63:20 67:6,14 differently 43:19 43:21 difficult 12:11 13:16 69:3 diminished32:15 direction 64:22 disadvantage 22:15 disagree 12:10 disagreement 19:13 discriminate 15:24 discrimination 14:20 63:3,6 discuss 51:20 discussion 50:22</p>	<p>dismiss 66:4 dismissal 13:2 dismissed12:15 dispute 21:23 32:24 distinction 16:10 distinctions 43:22 distinguish10:22 22:23 distinguishable 4:11,13 distinguishes 7:5 22:25 41:3 distinguishing 42:13 district 48:3 64:17 doctrine 32:19 doing 48:12,15 61:17 domestic 22:7 43:15 DONALD 1:19 2:9 50:6 door 54:17 63:21 doubt 50:24 Dr 30:13 draw22:11,11 due 27:19 38:5 68:9 duty 7:25 8:21 9:2 34:12 35:25 D.C 1:8,15,17,20</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">E</p> <hr/> <p>E 2:1 3:1,1 earlier52:23 earnest 12:2 easy 38:24 63:16 63:22 effect 17:18 20:1 22:6 56:14 60:5 60:23 61:24 62:8,11,16,19</p>	<p>effectively 10:2 effects 54:21 55:25,25 56:1 56:18 60:22 62:6 eight 52:9 65:24 either4:25 26:24 34:12,18 42:8 44:11 56:24 elected9:6,10,15 30:7 33:3 56:25 election 4:15 30:14 33:20 else's 62:10 emotional 24:5 46:5 emphasized28:3 46:4 enacted22:8 40:25 enactments 6:17 8:15 enforce 9:5 35:4 35:5 enforced7:14 10:9,17,21,22 enforcement 5:10 engage 12:2 26:25 27:5 enormous 36:5 ensure 9:23 entire 52:8 entirely 47:10 equal 38:4 39:1 42:1 46:14 50:12 51:22 52:24 54:8 57:23,24 59:10 61:7 63:1 equality 53:5 55:22,23 equation55:17 erects 68:20 especially 21:24</p>	<p>ESQ 1:15,17,19 2:3,6,9,13 essential 9:20 16:22 56:9 essentially 65:11 65:16 66:8 68:25 ET 1:3,6 ethical 36:1 evaluate 52:25 eventual 28:6 everybody 37:13 62:10 evidence 48:7,22 61:17 evolutionary 40:8 exacting 51:24 63:1 exactly 18:15 33:16 42:9 57:16 examine 22:5 example 32:5,21 43:6 46:13 exception 13:21 exclude 37:17 38:14 excluded50:3 excluding 17:1 37:2 38:6 39:9 exclusion 59:11 60:16 excuse 9:17 11:23,24 executing 35:11 executive 34:14 exercise 47:14 exist 46:24 existed 3:13 49:12 existence 66:14 exists 43:12 expectation 28:6 experiment 19:2</p>
---	--	--	---	---

<p>19:6 64:21 experiments 65:19 expert 18:12 22:4 44:6 experts 15:16 explain 17:12 explained 13:10 13:11 exploitation 47:9 expression 4:3 extending 61:15 extension 50:1 extent 14:3 43:24 extract 12:24 extreme 13:5</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">F</p> <p>faced 39:8,9 fact 22:4 23:21 44:22 65:21 68:11 factor 14:10 factors 63:8 factual 7:11 fair 29:4,10 63:25 fairly 13:2 19:2 faith 12:10 families 22:10 60:5 62:5 66:12 family 19:15 36:21 far 43:1,2 66:11 fare 61:4 fast 13:2 father 27:10 fatherhood 14:1 favorably 52:4 favors 29:25 fear 34:10 Federal 6:8,9 8:16 10:14 12:15 13:6,21</p>	<p>32:20,20 35:3 38:17 53:25 feel 10:17 11:3 11:20 36:8 fees 31:18 33:24 36:5 female 27:24 fertile 25:13,17 25:18 fertility 26:9 fewer 60:11 fidelity 25:10 26:17 fiduciary 7:25 8:10,13,20 9:1 31:1 33:23 34:12 35:25 figure 64:22 fine 61:17 finish 26:21 finished 6:3 first 12:13 18:11 51:23 56:12 57:4,9 66:19 five 7:3 10:19 11:3 21:12 29:18 30:12 flag 51:23 flags 52:1 63:1 Florida 67:3 focus 24:10 59:22 64:20 followed 4:8 following 67:12 footing 46:14 forbid 59:3 forbids 59:11 force 45:11 foresee 18:14 forgive 66:25 67:11,21 form 38:20 formal 50:20 51:2 former 62:21</p>	<p>forth 11:7 29:13 34:11 44:20,21 44:22 forward 3:23 5:25 9:18 11:13 53:1 found 10:19 four 19:2 30:12 33:21 57:1 65:5 Fourteenth 38:15 fourth 60:17,24 framed 15:3 frankly 13:5 free 11:20 15:24 32:21 36:8 50:24 freedom 47:19 frequently 31:12 friend 29:3 37:11 45:11,12,13 57:5 64:9 full 21:19,19 48:20 53:5,5 55:22,23 fundamental 27:14 34:10 41:6 43:21,23 44:17,18 46:4,7 46:9,23 47:19 49:7 51:21 56:8 56:22 61:8 fundamentally 18:21 further 17:3,5 65:20 further 23:14 future 18:14 38:11 55:7 56:21 58:24</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">G</p> <p>G 3:1 gambling 43:7 gay 23:2,9,22</p>	<p>39:9 44:4 47:13 50:11 53:4,15 55:18,22 60:4 62:21 gays 28:21 37:17 38:6 39:16 41:8 44:17 gender 13:9,23 gendered 13:24 13:25 14:1,1,2 genderless 17:7 23:25 gender-based 12:19 13:14,20 13:23 general 1:19 4:12,24 8:7,8 8:12 30:6,18,19 50:5,9,17 51:16 52:6,16 54:7,15 55:11,14 57:1 57:15,18 58:6 58:10,21 59:4,7 60:3,9,12,21 61:11,22 62:4 62:24 63:14,20 63:24 66:23 68:19 generalized 51:6 generally 9:3,4 General's 65:23 66:7 generous 42:24 getting 4:7 46:10 47:14 Ginsburg 3:24 4:5 12:17,22 19:18 20:4,25 27:12,18,20 49:23 52:6 63:18 66:16,25 67:2,5,8,13,19 give 7:1 19:9 24:11 29:19 35:12,17 39:3</p>	<p>40:13 62:22 given 6:24 23:21 30:9 55:21 57:23 gives 42:16 glad 67:21 go 17:3,5 29:20 30:20 36:6 43:1 48:8,14 51:1 52:12 59:6 62:9 66:11 goes 48:14 going 7:24,25 24:11 27:13 34:15 38:9 43:2 50:14 51:12 63:15 good 11:5 12:10 53:18 54:11,12 54:13 56:14,15 goodwill 12:9 government 9:5 9:6 14:12 15:24 16:2 31:11 62:22 government's 24:19 52:13 governor 30:6,19 30:20 31:5,11 governors 30:1 grant 49:6 65:12 65:16 granted 3:24 48:18,20 58:14 64:10 65:10 66:4 granting 14:13 grievance 51:6 ground 55:20 group 6:22 11:3 16:3 22:15 33:11 37:2 47:18 63:2 guess 4:23 6:13 13:23 32:11</p>
--	--	--	---	---

49:23 62:16	37:3	identify 6:19	inconsistent	18:20,24 23:14
<hr/> H <hr/>	history 21:13	8:18	44:16 45:1	23:20,25 36:12
hair 68:1	49:25 63:3	identifying 15:13	61:14	37:3,4,5,12,25
halfway 48:14	hit 19:5 65:19	identity 42:15	incremental 22:6	56:19 66:15
half-hearted	hold 25:21	ignore 52:1	incurring 33:24	68:16
29:21	Hollingsworth	ignored 50:2	36:5	integrity 9:21,21
hand 21:14 29:23	1:3 3:4	III 6:9 8:24 29:14	independent	intends 27:5
hands 10:1	homosexual 37:7	32:2 34:8 50:25	31:9	interest 4:9,25
happen 40:6,6	38:14	51:10,15	indistinguishable...	8:8 10:8,21
59:25 60:7	homosexuals	imagine 23:18	68:8,9	11:5 14:23,24
happening 17:15	14:10 37:5	65:6	individual 7:17	15:1,2,3 16:19
happens 23:20	39:11	immediate 21:14	7:19 8:3 32:1	17:3,4 22:16
31:7 35:3	honor 3:19 4:1	immediately	36:13 46:17	24:17,19 25:7
happiness 36:18	4:14 5:1,7,23	16:9	individuals 8:2	27:3,4 31:14
happy 3:17	6:4,13 7:15	immemorial 38:1	9:9 16:10 40:3	33:22 35:10,11
hard 65:3,6	8:23 9:8 11:9	immutability	40:18 41:7,25	35:13,13,18
68:10	11:18,22 12:25	15:18	42:12 44:4	36:4,23 47:4
harm 13:12	13:3,15,18	impacts 14:4	47:18 49:22	55:20 57:25
17:15,16 18:1	14:15,25 15:25	implausible 13:4	indulgence 49:8	interested 4:7
20:23,24 62:2	16:21 17:5,11	implications	infertile 24:23	45:16 46:22
harmed 61:18	18:4,16,25	18:23	26:3	interests 6:1,16
harmful 19:16	19:23 20:2,8,9	importance	information 19:5	7:21 10:19 15:5
20:15,16 62:20	20:19 21:3,8,22	21:23 56:23	21:11,12	17:9,23 25:11
harms 17:4,8	22:3,9 23:15,24	important 8:22	inheritance	30:7 37:9,10,12
19:22 61:20	24:14,21 25:6	10:17 21:20	47:10	51:18 52:25
Hawaii 13:21	25:10 26:1,15	28:18,22 47:19	initiative 3:20	53:7 54:18 55:5
hear 3:3	26:23 27:16	49:24 56:7 57:3	4:19,22 7:12	interfere 23:2
heard 64:13	28:1 29:6 36:10	68:14	8:3,19,19 9:19	internally 61:14
heart 59:22	48:20 50:18	impose 58:8	9:21,23,24 10:3	Internet 56:20
heavy 55:3	52:17 55:15	imposes 25:9	10:4 11:14,16	interpretation
heels 13:3	57:22 62:25	26:16 59:18	11:16 30:2,18	4:16
heightened	64:7,11,16,24	imposing 14:11	30:20 32:5,21	interpreted
12:20 55:1	65:3,22 67:10	impossible 18:13	33:1,6 51:4	10:12
63:10,16	67:11,20	65:21,25	initiatives 3:25	interracial 38:21
held 29:22	honoring 66:12	impression 12:14	56:24	45:23 49:11,12
help 24:18	Honor's 52:22	improper 14:21	initiators 34:23	67:16 68:2
helps 19:22	hundreds 49:14	improvidently	injury 7:13,16,17	intimacy 46:18
heterosexual	hurt 53:17	66:4	7:19,21 21:15	intimate 12:22
27:5 68:17	hurts 53:15 54:2	incest 47:1	21:15 32:2,10	invalid 29:23
high 4:3 11:25	hypothetical	incidents 28:4	inmates 27:24,25	67:17
highest 3:10	5:21 6:25 16:6	include 12:4 13:9	insist 45:16	invalidated 10:4
highly 52:2	<hr/> I <hr/>	17:22 19:11	insisted 48:22	invasion 25:21
historic 24:1	identifiable 6:21	37:7,10,13	insofar 13:8,8,9	involving 43:7
historically 10:5	identified 54:20	including 16:24	institution 13:25	ironically 59:21
		25:12	17:8,9,10,16	irony 55:12

<p>irrational 13:10 14:21 19:1 irrationally 16:3 irrelevant 20:12 67:25 irrespective 40:19 irresponsible 26:25 issue 3:16 12:11 20:5 21:25 27:22 47:8 48:24 49:1,5 55:7 57:8 64:21 68:23 issued 37:21 issues 3:15 10:1 12:12,12 47:9 48:21 49:6 51:18 64:25 it'd 3:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">J</p> <hr/> <p>J 1:15 2:3,13 3:6 64:2 job 14:13 JR 1:19 2:9 50:6 judge 48:22 64:17 judgment 5:12 21:1 30:9 64:12 judicial 64:13 65:16 jurisdiction 64:17 66:1 jurisdictional 3:15 29:11,13 50:15 jurisdictions 19:6 jurisprudence 52:24 justices 13:5 justification 23:9 63:6 justifications</p>	<p>44:21 52:20 justified 54:3 justify 60:16</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">K</p> <hr/> <p>Kagan 5:9,11,14 5:20 6:24 16:13 16:23 17:12 24:8,16 25:1,14 25:23 26:6,10 26:13,21 Kagan's 18:8 Karcher 5:8 7:18 keep 37:5 63:25 Kennedy 6:23 13:13,16 17:25 18:6,9 21:9 22:12 29:17 42:20 48:5,12 48:24 49:14,18 52:23 64:5 66:5 key 7:9 kid 55:2 kind 5:13 10:11 10:15,16 12:19 60:14 kinds 35:15,16 know 18:14,23 19:9,20,21 24:17 25:17 28:16 29:7 32:4 33:4 34:3 39:18 40:10 41:16,21 45:23,25 46:1,2 53:24 54:5,10 62:9 65:11,13 67:21 knowing 18:21 KRISTIN 1:6</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">L</p> <hr/> <p>label 45:3,4,6,7 45:16,17 labeling 28:24 labels 45:20</p>	<p>language 49:23 late 65:9,10 Laughter 24:25 25:5,19 26:7 29:8 31:10 39:4 48:11 50:16 law 4:10 5:5 7:3 10:9,17,21,22 30:6,17 32:24 33:10,12 34:14 34:16 35:11,11 35:14,14 38:3 38:10,11,12,18 40:25 49:15 52:3,5 53:2,3 Lawrence 46:11 47:17 laws 7:14 22:7 47:1 50:12 52:19 63:19 lead 17:8 51:22 leaders 5:8 learned 49:21 leave 6:8 29:23 55:9,10 led 38:8 Lee 52:2 left 33:10 47:5 56:23 58:23 legal 17:20 21:15 21:15,15 36:5 53:4 60:8,11 legislation 9:5 legislative 5:8 57:8,20 legislators 7:18 legitimate 22:16 67:25 68:1,4,7 legitimation 28:7 legs 52:19 54:18 lesbian 39:9 44:4 47:13 50:11 53:4 55:19,22 lesbians 28:21 37:17 38:6 41:8</p>	<p>44:17 letting 64:21,21 let's 22:25 31:8 37:4,5 66:6,6 level 46:10 liberty 36:17 42:15 licenses 24:11 lie 10:14,16 life 28:22 light 56:4 58:3 59:4 limit 65:22,25 limitations 13:1 limited 30:23 47:24 64:15 limits 48:2 line 32:17 46:21 litigated 54:23 litigation 51:9 little 17:13 live 21:18 44:1 lived 3:12 living 44:24 locked 27:13 long 22:21 41:17 long-term 18:23 61:23 look 22:25 23:13 43:7 53:14 looked 43:5 49:2 looking 23:18 loses 29:24 losing 22:18 lot 25:3 53:18 54:14 56:13 lots 23:6 Loving 13:3 45:21 49:10 61:1 66:18 67:22</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">M</p> <hr/> <p>M 1:6 maintain 13:7</p>	<p>making 10:22 11:1 25:12 41:6 43:22 51:13 66:2 male 27:24 malice 13:11 man 25:3 manner 39:15 47:24 March 1:9 marital 25:9 26:16 27:2,2,7 27:7 marriage 3:13,13 12:3 13:8,24 14:8,17,23 15:1 16:12,19 17:7 17:16,22,23 18:2,12 19:11 20:14 21:6 22:6 23:3,9,13,21 23:25 24:3,4,10 24:11,20 25:4 25:16,17 26:25 27:1,2 28:1,4,6 28:22 36:12,16 36:21 37:3 38:14 41:6 42:16 43:11,15 44:18 45:7,24 46:3,8,14,16 46:23 53:5,25 55:19,25 56:1,5 56:7,10,11 58:15,19 59:3 59:11,22 61:15 61:21,24,25 62:14 64:14 66:3,14,20,21 67:9 68:2,4,7 68:15 marriages 31:21 31:23 38:21 47:8 49:12 married 23:7,23</p>
--	---	---	---	---

<p>36:15,20,24 38:7 40:18,22 42:19 44:9 45:22 46:10 47:1,14 54:1 60:8 marry 17:2 23:2 23:4 27:14,15 47:5 59:20,20 62:6 marrying 39:16 Massachusetts 19:3 matter 1:11 39:14 46:18 51:19 69:12 mature 65:20 maturing 19:7 McLaughlin 66:19 67:2 mean 23:6 35:19 48:20 53:19 56:20 65:10,11 Meaning 46:24 means 5:15 45:7 45:13 46:17 49:22 measure 3:21,23 6:20 29:18 32:5 32:14 36:11 53:9 54:8 measured 58:2 meet 55:4 meeting 63:16 members 32:13 memory 67:13 men 26:8,8 mention 19:10 mentioned 56:3 67:22 merits 3:15 11:20 29:3 36:9 51:21 metaphor 48:9 minimum 27:24</p>	<p>minute 40:21 minutes 64:1 missing 35:19,20 35:22,23 moment 28:17 62:20 66:7 money 7:2,5 monogamy 25:10 morning 3:4 mother 27:10 47:1 motherhood 14:1 move 36:9 multiple 47:8</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">N</p> <hr/> <p>N 2:1,1 3:1 narrow 42:23 48:13 narrower 41:15 49:4 58:11 nationwide 20:12 natural 68:13 nature 37:6 42:18 51:6 necessarily 8:4 necessary 46:2 need 9:4 54:24 56:4 59:16 needs 24:5 neither 25:12 Nelson 12:14,18 12:24 13:2 Netherlands 56:13 neutral 59:18 never 4:2 39:8 41:23 new 3:10 11:25 21:11 43:6 49:15 56:12 newer 56:19 newness 56:4 nine 13:5 52:9 Ninth 42:22 48:1</p>	<p>48:4,25 49:1 64:12 norm 25:9 26:16 27:3 normal 8:13 57:20 number 7:1 46:25</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">O</p> <hr/> <p>O 2:1 3:1 obligation 8:11 8:13 26:17 obligations 25:10 30:9 observation 13:4 50:21 observed 11:25 obvious 67:24 occurring 16:8 odd 43:3 offer 14:16 50:21 offered 52:21 64:13 offering 16:7 officer 8:16 30:24 34:19 35:24 36:2 officers 30:2,9 official 3:19 4:17 4:18,19 5:18 7:1 11:12 34:1 51:8,9 officials 6:17 9:15,15,16,24 10:1,2 11:16 33:4,7 34:14 35:4,4 56:25 offspring 27:9 Oh 22:20 37:19 43:13 48:19 okay 6:5 29:1 41:16 42:4 53:22 Oklahoma 44:12</p>	<p>old 19:2 49:15 oldest 19:3 Olson 1:17 2:6 28:11,12,14 29:2,5,12 30:4 30:15,22 31:7 31:11,16 32:3 32:16 33:16 34:9,17,24 35:1 35:21,23 36:10 37:15,22 38:2 38:19 39:7,17 39:23 40:1,7,11 40:15 41:2,14 41:18,23 42:5 42:10 43:5,13 43:20 44:15 45:4,7,18 46:8 46:20 47:6 48:1 48:19 49:1,17 49:20 64:9,20 once 4:8 17:19 48:14 50:2 ones 63:13 one's 34:15 one-way 29:20 29:25 ongoing 12:6 open 31:22 42:24 55:7,9,10 58:23 59:12 60:13 63:22 operates 22:14 opinion 13:22 43:4 48:13 53:19 54:12 opponent 43:24 opponents 35:2 45:8 opposed 35:14 opposing 21:1 opposite 16:16 52:5 opposite-sex 15:6 16:17</p>	<p>17:17 18:2 68:7 68:13 Optical 52:2 opticians 52:4 options 31:24 optometrists 52:4 oral 1:11 2:2,5,8 3:6 28:12 50:6 orientation 14:6 14:10 15:10 40:2,19 49:22 Orleans 43:6 ought 15:10 35:6 41:20 55:7 58:23 61:4 63:21 outlive 26:9 outset 36:11 outside 14:7,8 27:1,1 overbearing 47:3 overcome 54:12 54:13 over-reads 27:20 27:21</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">P</p> <hr/> <p>P 3:1 pact 53:24 62:14 pacts 62:17 PAGE 2:2 par 52:3 paradigm 63:9 parenting 57:23 parents 21:18,19 44:5,8 55:21,22 59:19 62:6,10 62:10 part 36:16,24 42:19 46:3 49:25 61:7 particular 5:10 27:23 35:7 37:2 65:15 66:1</p>
---	---	--	--	---

<p>particularized 7:19</p> <p>particularly 8:19 48:6 64:16</p> <p>parties 24:23 26:2 51:13 56:6</p> <p>partnership 22:7</p> <p>partnerships 43:15</p> <p>party 25:12,13 26:24</p> <p>passed 4:9</p> <p>patently 67:24</p> <p>patriarchy 47:9</p> <p>pause 19:5 57:6 65:19</p> <p>pay 7:2,5</p> <p>pen 59:9</p> <p>penalized 43:2</p> <p>people 3:22 6:1 7:24 9:4,6,7,10 9:11 10:19 11:3 12:1 16:4 23:6 24:12 25:16 26:10,13 30:16 31:20,23 32:1,7 32:7,8 33:2,6 33:14 35:9 37:3 40:21 44:1,24 46:25 50:2 56:23 65:18 66:11 67:6,14 68:11 69:4,5</p> <p>people's 25:25</p> <p>perceived 31:13</p> <p>percent 48:15</p> <p>percolate 65:12</p> <p>perfectly 44:4,5</p> <p>perform 31:23</p> <p>performs 31:21</p> <p>period 27:6</p> <p>perk 64:25 65:1</p> <p>permanent 57:7 68:21</p> <p>permissible 42:1</p>	<p>permit 19:12,17 22:11 38:6 52:9</p> <p>permitted 28:1 43:8,9</p> <p>Perry 1:6 3:4</p> <p>person 12:9 31:16 33:11 35:12,13,18</p> <p>personal 8:8 31:20 36:16</p> <p>personalized 32:1</p> <p>persons 50:11</p> <p>Petitioners 1:4 1:16 2:4,14 3:7 51:5,25 52:18 52:21 53:8 54:23 58:1 59:21 63:3,5 64:3</p> <p>phones 56:19</p> <p>phrased 42:6</p> <p>pick 17:13</p> <p>picking 47:18</p> <p>place 55:9 65:20</p> <p>Plaintiffs 15:16 15:20 18:11 33:13</p> <p>play 48:8</p> <p>please 3:9 22:19 28:15 50:10</p> <p>plebiscite 31:6</p> <p>podium 63:5</p> <p>point 6:14 10:25 18:1 20:10,18 20:20 21:11 22:12 32:11 33:4,5 51:4 52:17,22,22 57:9,21 60:17 60:24</p> <p>pointed 36:11 47:21</p> <p>points 18:10 51:22 57:1</p>	<p>58:17</p> <p>polar 52:5</p> <p>policy 44:25</p> <p>political 21:24 69:4</p> <p>polygamy 47:7 47:12</p> <p>pose 68:14</p> <p>posed 63:7</p> <p>position 15:11 16:22 20:16 30:16,21 50:19 50:20 51:1,2 52:13 58:11,12 58:12,18,22 59:1,8 60:1 61:13</p> <p>positions 9:6</p> <p>possibility 27:15</p> <p>possible 19:25</p> <p>possibly 12:9 18:22 66:11</p> <p>potential 55:25 56:1</p> <p>powers 32:15,19</p> <p>preceded 66:19</p> <p>precedential 13:1</p> <p>precious 9:22</p> <p>precise 15:8</p> <p>precisely 23:1 33:14</p> <p>prefer 31:22</p> <p>pregnancy 28:2</p> <p>prepared 51:20 54:16</p> <p>prescribe 38:11</p> <p>present 51:24 63:2,8</p> <p>presented 12:13 21:5</p> <p>preservation 56:9,10</p> <p>preserving 66:14</p> <p>prevail 63:23</p>	<p>previously 28:1</p> <p>primarily 10:8</p> <p>prime 49:25</p> <p>principal 16:15 16:18 60:25</p> <p>principle 54:10</p> <p>principled 47:24</p> <p>prior 40:25</p> <p>prison 27:13,22 27:23 28:5</p> <p>privacy 25:21 36:17 42:14 46:10,17</p> <p>pro 15:3 46:14</p> <p>probably 47:3</p> <p>probing 15:9</p> <p>problem 23:13 42:9,9 48:5,5 52:18 61:10,15</p> <p>procedures 4:8</p> <p>proceed 6:7 11:20 16:2</p> <p>process 4:19 9:19,21,23,25 10:4,18,21 11:14,17 21:24 30:3 33:2,6 34:18,22 38:5 51:4 57:9,20</p> <p>procreate 16:17</p> <p>procreation 15:4 16:19 23:3,14 23:21 24:11,19 25:7,11 27:15 36:21,22,23 42:18,19 46:9 55:20</p> <p>procreational 46:15</p> <p>procreative 24:2 25:8 26:25 46:6 68:13,17,17</p> <p>produce 27:8</p> <p>professional 30:8</p>	<p>proffered 8:7</p> <p>profound 18:23</p> <p>progress 52:12</p> <p>prohibit 38:21 39:15</p> <p>prohibiting 43:9 43:10 47:12,14</p> <p>prohibitions 49:11</p> <p>prohibits 47:11 47:13</p> <p>prolonged 27:6</p> <p>proper 4:8 6:24 7:20</p> <p>properly 13:19 48:18,20 64:9 64:10,10 69:5</p> <p>proponents 3:19 3:25 4:6,17,20 5:18 7:1,3,17 11:12 29:18 30:12 31:25 33:19,21,21</p> <p>proposed 8:2</p> <p>proposition 3:20 28:19 32:22 33:9,10 37:20 40:20,24 45:15 50:11 51:25 52:3,21 56:2,16 57:5 58:2 61:19 61:23 68:20</p> <p>propositions 66:1</p> <p>proprietary 4:9 4:24</p> <p>protecting 42:25 47:4</p> <p>protection 38:5 39:1 50:12 51:23 52:24 54:8 59:10 61:7 63:1</p> <p>prove 20:21</p> <p>provide 4:15</p>
--	---	---	--	--

<p>43:18 provided 44:14 provides 43:14 provision 22:14 provisions 31:9 public 6:17 9:15 9:24,25 10:2,7 10:7,23 11:4,16 33:3,7 56:25 purpose 24:3 67:25 68:1,4,7 purposes 24:2 37:6 pursues 37:12 pursuit 36:17 push 57:6 pushed 57:6 put 7:12 28:19 46:14 puts 12:6 52:25 68:25</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Q</p> <p>qualify 15:12,17 16:4 quasi-suspect 15:11 question 5:15,16 6:14 7:15 8:7 12:5,7,16 13:6 13:16 15:8,23 16:2 17:21,21 18:8,19 20:18 22:2 28:17 32:24 34:18 38:9,18,20,24 39:3,3 41:9 42:6,7 48:16 50:15 51:17 52:10 56:22 59:12 60:13 66:20 67:12 68:5,10 69:4,5 questionnaire 25:16</p>	<p>questions 47:8 48:23 quite 3:11 15:14 15:16,22 30:23 34:12 53:18 59:14 61:8</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">R</p> <p>R 3:1 races 67:6,15 racial 65:1 Raines 32:13 raise 38:17 raised 27:10 52:23 57:22 61:16 raises 47:8 raising 19:14 24:4 44:6 rapidly 12:1 rare 24:22 ratchet 29:20,25 rational 12:9 14:9,12 20:21 22:13 52:2 54:24 61:5 rationale 42:22 43:3 54:20 55:8 rationalization 43:9 rationally 22:16 reach 42:22 67:9 read 11:6 45:25 57:13 68:22 reading 16:14 real 59:18 62:11 62:11,12,19 66:2 reality 53:9 really 10:17,18 11:3,4,7 24:10 25:1 42:20 48:6 51:5 52:5 53:19 64:20 68:5 realm 63:7</p>	<p>real-world 18:13 18:15,16 62:16 rearing 55:21 reason 11:5 14:9 16:24,25 18:25 19:17 23:16 46:2,3 59:13 reasonable 17:6 37:24 rebuttal 2:12 22:19 64:2 recall 22:12 31:8 recognition 21:19 45:24 46:19 recognize 22:8 recognized 7:20 46:3 61:6 recognizing 60:18 66:12 record 54:22 60:14,15,19,22 60:23 red 21:17 59:4,9 redefine 19:10 redefined 18:21 redefining 17:7 17:22 18:12 21:6 23:25 redefinition 18:24 64:14 referendums 56:24 referring 27:16 refocus 24:2,3 refused 11:17 refusing 10:3 regard 14:16 regardless 16:4 68:24 register 7:5 regulate 68:16 regulating 16:19 24:19 regulation 27:25</p>	<p>reiterate 17:20 reject 33:9 rejected 9:13 relation 28:22 relationship 36:15 43:11 59:22 relationships 22:9 28:25 66:13 68:18 remain 31:22 55:7 63:22 remarked 3:11 remember 66:18 remove 42:14 render 56:17 repeals 63:19 repeatedly 41:8 represent 5:25 6:6,16 31:3 36:3 representative 8:14,22 9:1 representatives 3:21 7:20 representing 8:1 10:25 represents 32:25 reproduction 53:6 require 54:9 required 7:4 41:24 58:19,22 60:1 requirements 8:21 requires 51:25 52:24 reserve 27:6 resonates 49:25 resources 32:6,8 32:8 respect 7:11 15:4 16:3 24:21 25:8 27:20 30:5 34:7</p>	<p>41:4 43:22,23 46:9,25,25 47:9 51:3,21 53:3 54:21 57:21 58:2 60:3,13 61:1 66:2 68:3 68:3,9 respectfully 49:20 58:10 Respondents 1:18,21 2:7,11 12:8 13:7 20:21 28:13 50:8 67:22 68:10,22 response 56:2 57:2,11 responsibilities 4:18 11:12,13 11:15 responsibility 4:21 8:1,18 20:21 31:1,1,17 31:18 33:23 34:1 36:23 responsible 15:3 25:7,11 55:20 rest 58:4 59:24 60:1 68:23,25 restrictions 46:23,24 result 13:11 51:9 review 20:22 22:13 52:2 rhetorical 38:20 right 5:7 7:11 9:22 14:18 20:8 27:14,15 36:13 36:13,14,15,16 36:16,20,24 37:1,22 38:7,8 38:11 40:18 41:6 42:14,19 43:23 44:18 45:6 46:4,7,9 46:23 47:15</p>
---	--	--	--	---

<p>53:22,23 55:16 59:3,25 60:7,8 62:12,19 rights 5:12 44:1 50:2 53:4 55:13 57:24,24,24 58:15 60:11 risks 68:14 river 65:13 ROBERTS 3:3 3:14 6:2,5 11:19 22:17 26:20 28:8,11 29:2,7,9 31:19 36:8,25 37:19 37:23 40:23 45:2,5,9 46:1 50:4,13 53:13 58:16 59:6,23 60:6,10 61:9,12 62:1 63:24 69:8 roiling 69:1 Romer 22:13 47:16 49:3,4 root 16:12 route 36:6 rule 20:12 ruling 65:22</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">S</p> <hr/> <p>S 2:1 3:1 Safley 27:21 same-race 68:2 same-sex 12:4 12:22 13:9 14:4 15:5 16:16,18 16:24 17:2,23 19:11,12,17 20:6,14 21:18 22:9 31:23 42:25 43:15,18 45:5 55:25 56:1 56:5,11 58:19 59:3,11 60:7 61:16,16,20</p>	<p>62:2,5 66:3,13 68:8 satisfy 32:2 saw 30:5 saying 7:7 11:23 14:22 15:1 17:1 23:9 45:15 54:11,16 59:24 63:21 66:16,17 says 5:5 11:11 35:8 52:8 65:23 Scalia 4:23 5:2,5 8:6 19:8,20,25 20:11 25:15,20 26:4 31:4,15 38:8,24 39:5,12 39:18,20,24 40:5,9,13 41:11 41:16,19,20 42:4,8 58:4,7 58:11 59:1 65:9 Scalia's 22:24 school 62:9 schools 38:23 42:1 science 61:3 scientific 20:17 scrutiny 12:20 51:24 54:9 55:1 61:5 63:1,10,16 second 52:17 57:10,21 second-rate 28:25 security 27:25 see 17:15 40:5 56:21 59:4 60:14 61:14 seeing 4:7 10:8 27:3,4 seen 13:6 segregation 65:1 selecting 47:15 Senate 26:5 sense 7:6 13:24</p>	<p>14:2 15:19 17:6 37:9 43:11 66:22 sentence 59:9 separate 7:13 38:23 41:25 separation 32:19 seriously 43:13 43:16 59:17 serve 17:2 24:18 37:6 serves 37:8 set 29:13 sets 34:11 sever 24:1 sex 16:16 sexes 23:4 sexual 14:6,9 15:10 40:2,19 49:22 short 58:15 show 32:9 54:24 54:25 shown 62:2 side 11:1 37:11 44:7 55:16 significant 59:14 60:25 similar 3:10 similarly 15:7 16:10,16 68:3 simply 7:6 13:4 15:6 22:3,10 29:23,23 66:3 single 64:17,17 single-sex 19:15 situated 15:7 16:10,17 68:3 situation 34:16 55:5,17 58:25 situations 35:16 60:18 skin 67:24 Skinner 46:12 social 18:20,24</p>	<p>61:2 society 3:13 17:9 27:3 47:20 56:9 56:10 64:22 68:15,16 society's 15:2 25:6,7 36:13 sociological 21:11 48:7 sociologists 19:14 Solicitor 1:19 65:23 66:7,22 68:19 somebody 27:13 45:10 somewhat 61:14 sorry 6:3 26:18 26:20,22 sort 14:14 16:24 44:1 Sotomayor 7:10 7:22-8:6,10,20 9:3,9 14:7,18 15:9,21 26:18 26:22 32:16 34:9,21,25 46:20 47:23 55:11 60:19 63:12 64:19,25 65:4 special 10:19 specific 5:18 9:13 22:2 27:23 40:7 64:12 specifically 9:13 44:7 specificity 54:5 specify 9:4 32:13 spend 28:16 31:8 spirituality 42:15 spouses 67:25 stabilizing 60:5 61:23 62:8 stand 55:21</p>	<p>standard 15:12 54:8 standards 36:2 standing 3:16,20 3:25 6:10,15,15 28:17 29:14 31:21 32:9,23 48:2,17 50:19 50:21,25 51:4 51:11,13,15 start 32:22 started 62:25 starting 50:14 States 1:1,12,21 2:10 10:6,6,13 12:7,23 19:16 20:13,15 21:2 30:2 32:18 41:12 49:13,16 50:7 52:8,9,9 55:12 58:13,13 58:14,18,24 60:7,11,13 62:15,17 63:11 63:14,19 64:21 65:24 66:9 State's 4:3 6:17 6:18 7:21,21 8:15 15:2 16:18 17:3 35:10 53:7 54:18 stature 47:21 status 21:19 28:24 39:10 41:7,9 45:24 46:18 47:15,20 statute 9:17,17 29:22,22 33:3 35:5,5 step 5:25 11:13 56:17 63:15 65:18 66:6 steps 63:11 sterile 23:4 stigmatizing</p>
--	---	---	---	--

<p>28:23 stop 12:6 story 50:1 Strom 26:4 strong 11:2 51:15 strongly 10:20 11:4 study 22:5 submission 15:5 submit 6:19 7:16 8:18,23 16:7 41:14,23 49:20 69:4 submitted 69:10 69:12 submitting 66:8 substance 21:10 53:2 substantial 12:15 13:6 21:10 38:17 48:16 substantive 43:14 suffered 63:2 suggest 8:25 9:2 18:17 63:10 suggested 7:23 30:24 49:9 suggesting 34:7 55:4 suitable 44:4,5 summarizing 51:1 summary 13:1 superseded 13:22 support 22:9 45:25 supporter 6:20 supporters 45:15 56:16 supporting 1:21 2:11 50:8 61:13 suppose 22:23</p>	<p>24:7,8,9 25:15 31:15,19 45:11 54:19 63:18,18 supposed 40:9 57:8 Supreme 1:1,12 4:16 9:12 11:10 12:18 30:5,11 32:12 33:13,17 33:18 34:5 37:21,25 38:2,3 38:4,10 39:8,21 40:17,25 sure 27:17 31:25 36:25 37:1 45:9 61:11 67:11,12 surely 6:19 8:17 suspect 15:11 25:20 suspectedness 15:14 16:5 suspicious 33:8 sustain 43:4 sustained 22:14 system 10:14 32:7 34:5,6,6 34:19</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">T</p> <hr/> <p>T 2:1,1 table 66:15 take 10:1 20:16 23:7 42:12 50:19 53:19 57:8,19 59:8,9 59:17 64:6 taken 58:12 63:11,15 takes 11:1 34:8 talking 39:20,21 52:7 65:5 talks 43:25 Tam 30:13 taxes 47:10 taxpayer 7:14</p>	<p>tell 7:10 41:21 45:10,10 62:1 telling 62:15 66:23 tenuous 51:14 term 13:25 terms 6:6 11:11 11:18 terrible 63:3 test 6:25 16:5 34:11 45:25 tested 53:8 testified 44:7 tests 15:13 Thank 3:8 11:21 18:9 28:8,10,14 36:10 50:4 59:7 63:24 64:4 67:20 69:7,8 THEODORE 1:17 2:6 28:12 theory 6:25 54:23 thing 14:22 19:9 44:2,17 47:11 49:24 56:6,15 56:15 59:21 64:8 66:15 things 19:10 30:14 36:22 63:25 think 5:23 6:11 7:9,24 8:24 10:6,12 12:24 13:19 14:8,17 15:9,25 16:1,11 19:4,20 21:9,21 24:10,17 25:22 27:19 29:4,9,12 30:22,23 32:16 34:9 36:7 37:23 38:25 39:5 42:6 43:20 44:10,15 50:13,23 51:3 51:13 52:17,23</p>	<p>54:9,19 55:8,15 55:16 56:12 57:3,13 58:23 59:14 60:9,25 61:5,8,22 62:24 63:16,25 64:6 64:19 65:14 67:2,14 thinking 11:5 62:20 thinks 34:4 third 59:13 thoroughly 51:19 65:7 thought 28:18 33:17,18 34:5 50:17 56:8 66:16,17 thoughtful 12:9 thousands 56:11 thrust 16:22 Thurmond 26:4 thwart 30:2 tie 51:8 tied 53:25 time 17:8 20:18 22:18,19 23:23 25:25 31:7,9 35:3 38:1,16,25 40:8 63:16 64:22 times 7:4 57:14 today 40:16 42:11 50:22 51:14 63:5 66:18,24 told 33:13 tomorrow 51:12 51:20 tomorrow's 51:18 tool 23:21 tough 5:15 traditional 13:7 15:13 16:5,12</p>	<p>18:2 24:2,24 56:10 66:14 travel 45:19 treat 29:10 treated 13:14 treating 14:21 52:4 trial 48:21,21 true 6:6 8:9 13:6 14:19 20:9,11 20:17 21:3 39:2 53:17 59:10 68:11,12 truth 3:12 11:24 11:24 try 54:25 60:21 trying 13:17 20:20 29:5 Tuesday 1:9 turn 24:7 56:14 56:15 Turner 27:17,21 two 18:10 28:17 51:21 63:8</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">U</p> <hr/> <p>ultimately 67:23 unanimous 4:3 4:16 unanimously 12:15 uncertain 61:3 uncharted 48:8 49:9,10 unconstitutional 25:21 38:13,21 38:22 39:6,6,13 39:14,14,15,22 39:25 41:12,17 42:2,3 44:19 49:13 59:3 undefended 30:21 underlies 32:19 understand</p>
---	---	--	---	--

<p>15:22 16:14 49:21 52:7,22 55:3,15 59:16 understood 16:6 66:22 undertaken 66:10 unequal 29:1 union 27:8 43:1 45:23 63:19 unions 41:13 52:10 59:2 unison 7:3,4 United 1:1,12,20 2:10 10:13 49:16 50:7 52:8 58:18 Unlawful 67:19 Utah 44:12,20 U.S 57:17</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">V</p> <hr/> <p>v 1:5 3:4 12:14 12:17,24 13:2 32:13 67:3 vacuum 53:1 validity 3:23 4:21 6:16 8:15 Verrilli 1:19 2:9 50:5,6,9,17 51:16 52:6,16 54:7,15 55:14 57:1,15,18 58:6 58:10,21 59:4,7 60:3,9,12,21 61:11,22 62:4 62:24 63:14,20 version 22:24 veto 10:3 view 37:2,24 55:1 68:22 viewed 13:19 14:5 15:10 34:22 views 8:2,3</p>	<p>vindicate 10:8,18 10:20 11:4 violation 51:23 Virginia 61:2 66:19 Virtually 13:20 vision 23:2 vital 15:4 47:20 vitality 68:14 vivid 15:16 VMI 47:21 49:24 voice 21:16,20 vote 45:19 voter 18:18 19:1</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">W</p> <hr/> <p>wait 40:20 59:16 59:24 60:10,14 61:5 waited 67:9 waiting 59:17,18 61:6 wall 23:18 walls 36:12 walls-off 28:21 want 6:6,14 10:18,20 11:8,9 11:19 12:15 21:18 28:16 31:5 34:14 40:21 41:16 49:8 50:25 55:2 55:2,24 56:17 58:16,17 59:19 63:10 wants 29:15,18 42:22 warning 51:23 52:1 63:1 warrants 51:24 Washington 1:8 1:15,17,20 waters 48:8 49:9 49:10 way 9:17 13:25</p>	<p>18:22 21:4 23:1 27:20,20 30:4 30:12 42:7 47:23 48:15,15 52:12 ways 35:5 44:11 weigh 21:12 We'll 3:3 we're 43:22 44:16 54:15,16 54:16 55:4 58:7 we've 6:11 46:3 49:21,21 whatsoever 53:20 wholeheartedly 64:8 willing 59:23 withdrew 30:13 woman 25:2 wonder 48:17 wonderful 48:9 word 59:9 words 17:1 62:13 work 17:18 world 27:11 61:4 worry 22:18 worthy 64:15 wouldn't 20:4 wrestle 13:17 writ 66:4 write 41:15 62:13 wrong 45:24 67:14</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">X</p> <hr/> <p>x 1:2,7</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Y</p> <hr/> <p>Yeah 35:21 58:4 years 19:2 21:12 21:12 33:20 42:4 49:14 56:11 65:1,5 York 11:25</p>	<p>York's 3:10</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">Z</p> <hr/> <p>Zablocki 46:11</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">1</p> <hr/> <p>10 64:1 10:07 1:13 3:2 11:27 69:11 12-day 48:21 12-144 1:4 3:4 140 37:20 16 49:12 1791 38:14 1868 38:14 1898 65:1 1954 65:2 1967 49:10 61:1 1971 12:18,23</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">2</p> <hr/> <p>2,000 21:12 2000 56:13 2008 18:18 2013 1:9 25 33:20 26 1:9 28 2:7</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">3</p> <hr/> <p>3 2:4 37,000 44:6 62:5</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">4</p> <hr/> <p>40 10:6 40,000 21:17</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">5</p> <hr/> <p>50 2:11 12:7 42:4 65:1 500 57:14 55 24:13,18,22 25:3 26:11,14 55-year-old 27:3</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">6</p>	<p>64 2:14</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">7</p> <hr/> <p>70 48:15</p> <hr/> <p style="text-align: center;">8</p> <hr/> <p>8 3:20 28:19 37:20 40:20,24 45:15 50:11 51:25 52:3,21 56:2,16 57:5 58:2 61:19,23</p>
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